Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Fall

Article 4

A Face Off Between the National Hockey League
and the National Hockey League Players'
Association: The Goal a More Competitively
Balanced League
Ian Craig Pulver

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
Repository Citation
Ian Craig Pulver, A Face Off Between the National Hockey League and the National Hockey League Players' Association: The Goal a More
Competitively Balanced League, 2 Marq. Sports L. J. 39 (1991)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol2/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

A FACE OFF BETWEEN THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE AND THE NATIONAL
HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS'
ASSOCIATION: THE GOAL A
MORE COMPETITIVELY BALANCED
LEAGUEt
IAN CRAIG PULVER*

On September 15, 1991, the current collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between the National Hockey League (NHL or League) and the
National Hockey League Players' Association (NHLPA) expired.' In the
summer months preceding the expiration of the CBA, the member clubs of
the League (Owners) and the NHLPA commenced negotiations toward the
most important CBA in the NHL's history.
In other major professional sports,2 the decade of the 1980's proved to
be a rather volatile time between club owners and professional athletes.
The adversarial relationship between owners and players that developed
during this period is evidenced by players' strikes,3 owner lockouts,4 and
judicial decisions over antitrust issues in professional sports.

t The author wishes to give special thanks to Professor Joseph M. Weiler, University of
British Columbia Law School, for his insightful and thought provoking comments. Special
acknowledgement is extended to Robert W. Goodenow, Deputy Executive Director, National
Hockey League Players' Association and Brian P. Burke, Director Hockey Operations,
Vancouver Canucks of National Hockey League. Many special thanks to Corinne G. Sures and
Michael Forer for their editorial assistance and comments.
* Associate Counsel at the National Hockey League Players' Association. B.A. 1987, University of Western Ontario, LL.B. 1990, University of British Columbia Law School.
This article was originally written in 1989 and 1990 while the author was attending the University of British Columbia Law School, and was revised in the Fall of 1991. The views expressed
herein are not necessarily those of the National Hockey League Players' Association.
1. The current collective agreement was signed on June 1, 1988. 1988 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION
AND THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE MEMBER CLUBS (June 1, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 NHL
COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT].
2. This paper will refer to the four major professional sports. The National Football League
(NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL).
3. In June 1981, the Major League Baseball Players Association went on strike for fifty days
during the season. In 1985, the MLBPA went on strike for two days during the season. In 1982,
the National Football Players Association went on strike for fifty-seven days.
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In the NHL, the past relationship between Owners and the NHLPA has
been amicable and passive. Despite this, the next round of collective bargaining will become confrontational.
At the center of the dispute is the issue of free agency, more specifically,
a more liberalized form of free agency that will grant a player freedom to
choose the team that will be his employer. Presently, the NHL has a system of free agency that theoretically should provide for movement of players from Club to Club. In reality, the system of free agency in the NHL is
ineffective.
The Owners most beneficial arguments will encompass the following
points. First, a liberalized free agency system will adversely affect the economic and competitive balance of the NHL. Second, the current system of
restrictive restraints on player mobility including the players' draft, the
waiver draft, the current free agency system and other relevant provisions
in the CBA, serve to ensure the economic and competitive balance of the
League.
The NHLPA's most beneficial arguments will be threefold. First, a
more liberalized free agency system will enable the players to attain their
true market value. Second, players should be able to have the freedom to
play hockey in the city of their choice. Third, the League will be more
economically and competitively balanced if a more liberalized system of
free agency is adopted.
During negotiations for a new CBA, the League and the NHLPA will
have an opportunity to re-evaluate the status of the NHL. In doing so, the
objective of both parties should be to ensure that the League, during the
1990's and beyond, will be both economically and competitively balanced.
Since the League's original expansion in 1967-1968, this objective has not
been achieved.
The ultimate goal of every team in the NHL is to capture the Stanley
Cup. Since expansion in 1967-1968, only seven teams have won the Stanley
Cup.5 The continued dominance of these teams over the past twenty-four
4. In February 1990, the Major Legue Baseball Owners had "locked out" the players from
spring training. Historically the NBA and the NBPA have enjoyed a rather passive and amicable
relationship.
5. Montreal Canadiens
Boston Bruins
Philadelphia Flyers
New York Islanders
Edmonton Oilers
Calgary Flames
Pittsburgh Penguins. THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE OFFICIAL GUIDE AND RECORD
BOOK, 190 (1991-92) [hereinafter Record Book].
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years has resulted in the League being economically and competitively
unbalanced.
It is therefore contended that the lack of player mobility in the NHL
has drastically affected the competitive balance in the League. Few teams
each year have a realistic chance of winning the Stanley Cup. Consequently, a great disparity has arisen between Clubs that are suffering financially and those Clubs that have reaped the benefits of being successful in
the Stanley Cup playoffs. As a result, the League as a whole has not maximized its economic potential.
For the NHL to become a more competitively and economically balanced League, it is necessary to implement a more liberalized system of free
agency. In order for such a system to work effectively, an intricate revenue
sharing scheme and a salary cap system must be developed to ensure that
all Clubs in the League become economically and competitively balanced.
To achieve this goal by devising the optimum system of player mobility, it is
necessary to examine various issues that will have a direct effect on the
creation of such a system.
The first part of this paper will analyze the NHL's experience with antitrust issues; more specifically, the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions in the United States of America and their applicability to this issue.
The second part of this paper will conduct an indepth analysis of the current system of free agency in the NHL and examine free agency in the other
major professional sports. The third part of the paper will explore the impact free agency has had on the competitive balance in professional sports.
The fourth part of the paper will deal with the implementation of a modified free agency system in the NHL. This part will deal with issues such as:
the type of market a free agent will be attracted to; "revenue sharing program"; and a "salary cap system." The last part of the paper will perform a
case analysis. The subject: the St. Louis Blues - how a team can become
more economically and competitively successful.
I.

LABOR EXEMPTION - NATIONAL HocKEy LEAGUE

Collective bargaining agreements in professional sports are the governing documents between professional athletes and the Owners of the
Clubs in each respective league. The purpose of a collective bargaining
agreement is to incorporate all of the relevant issues that pertain to the
terms and working conditions of employment. The issue of player mobility
is just one of the many issues incorporated into the agreements.
There are two separate but related labor exemptions to the antitrust
laws in the United States of America that govern sports leagues' labor practices. The first is a statutory exemption. Section 6 of the Clayton Act pro-
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vides that, "[tlhe labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of
commerce." 6 It has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States of
America that this statutory exemption protects union organization and
union conduct in furtherance of legitimate labor goals.7
The statutory labor exemption does not operate to immunize agreements between labor and management from antitrust attack. The
courts have acknowledged that the application of antitrust laws to
labor management agreements would contradict the very nature of
the collective bargaining process put forth by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, the courts have devised a judicially created nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust laws.'
Second, the nonstatutory exemption was devised by the Supreme Court of
the United States in order to develop a labor policy favoring collective bargaining while, at the same time, ensuring that parties did not enter into
anti-competitive agreements. 9 In order for the nonstatutory exemption to
apply, the Supreme Court has set out specific minimum requirements that
must be fulfilled: first, the agreement must not include parties that are not
privy to the collective bargaining agreement;1" second, the matters in the
agreement that affect other employers or employment relationships are not
immunized;I and third the exemption is limited to matters that primarily
12
affect the immediate relationship between the parties.
The nonstatutory labor exemption became prominent in professional
sports litigation with the development of the various players' unions in the
late 1960s and 1970s. During this developmental stage, most, if not all, of
the professional leagues' prior labor practices were incorporated into collective bargaining agreements.13 As a result, sports leagues' labor practices fell
within the realm of federal labor laws.
The newly-formed NHLPA lacked the strength and power to collectively bargain on even ground with the League over contentious issues such
6. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1973 & Supp. 1991).
7. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965); United States v.
Hutcheson 312 U.S. 219, 229-237 (1941). See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the LaborExemption in
ProfessionalSports, 1989 DUKE L. J. 339, 353.
8. Lock, supra note 7, at 351-352.
9. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-66 (1965) (the union
forfeits the exemption when it is clearly shown that it agreed with the employer to impose certain
wage scales on other bargaining units). See Lock, supra note 7, at 352 n.78.
10. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 62223 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S., at 664-66.
12. Id. See generally, Lock, supra note 7, at 352.
13. Stephan R. McAllister, The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption and PlayerRestraints in ProfessionalSports: The PromisedLand or A Return to Bondage, 4 ENT.SPORTS L. J. 283, 286 (1987).
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as player mobility. Thus, the League was able to implement into the Collective Bargaining Agreement the restrictive mechanisms that restrained
player mobility.
As a result, the players and, on one occasion, a rival League, became
disenchanted with the rules that restrained player mobility, and sought relief from the courts. The typical plaintiff alleged that the then existing restrictive mechanism violated antitrust law. As a defense, the Clubs
attempted to utilize the non-statutory labor exemption to avoid antitrust
liability.
The statutory exemption issue was first dealt with in Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, v. PhiladelphiaHockey Club.14 The World Hockey Association (WHA), a rival League to the National Hockey League, claimed that
the NHL's perpetual reserve clause, affiliation agreements, and other measures regulating the mobility of players were in violation of antitrust laws."
The court, on a motion for summary judgment and on a request for a preliminary injunction, held that the labor exemption was inapplicable and
that the NHL could not rely on it. 6
The court analyzed the collective bargaining process between the Owners and the players to determine whether the restraints were the result of
serious, intensive, arm's length collective bargaining. 17 The court concluded this was not the case. In support of its conclusion, the court held
that the reserve clause had been forced upon the players prior to the union's
formation and, even though the evidence revealed that both sides had paid
some attention to the reserve clause, the parties had never collectively bargained the issue."
Judge Higgenbotham ruled that the NHL had a dominant market position and the League should not be allowed to utilize the reserve clause to
the detriment of its rival League, the WHA. 19 The WHA and its members
demonstrated that they were immediately 'and irreparably injured by the
enforcement of the reserve clause.20 They were deprived of the services of
professional players vital to the existence of a major professional league.2 1
14. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

15. Id at 466-67.
16. Id. at 500, 517-19. "The court purportedly based its inquiry on the statutory exemption,
but its references to nonstatutory exemption cases and its emphasis on collective bargaining belie
that assertion." McAllister, supra note 13, at 297.
17. Philadelphia World Hockey C. v. Philadelphia Hockey C., 351 F. Supp.462, 480-86 (E.D.

Pa. 1972).
18. Id. at 485.
19. Id. at 518.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Furthermore, Judge Higgenbotham stated:
[t]o grant the National Hockey League an exemption in this proceeding would undermine and thwart the policies which have
evolved over the years in disposing of labor-management and antitrust disputes. I cannot compatibly reconcile the National Hockey
League's monopolistic actions here with the labor exemptions from
the Sherman Act. 2
In reaction to the court's decision, the NHL reached an accord with the
WHA. The NHL agreed that the perpetual reserve clause in the League's
Standard Player Contract would be replaced with a one year option
clause.23
In 1979, the NHL was involved in another litigious matter. This was
the case of McCourt v. CaliforniaSports, Inc.2 4 The McCourt case has the
distinction of being the first major case to confront the labor exemption of
the antitrust laws when the clause in controversy was specifically incorporated into the League's collective bargaining agreement.2 5
On October 10, 1977, Dale McCourt (McCourt) a professional hockey
player signed a NHL Standard Player's Contract with the Detroit Hockey
Club, Inc. (Red Wings).2 6 The term of the contract was three years. 27 After the 1977-1978 season, the Red Wings signed Rogatien Vachon
(Vachon), who was a star goaltender with the Los Angeles Kings (Kings).
Vachon, who was a free agent, played out his option with the Kings. By
signing Vachon, the Red Wings had to make an equalization payment to
the Kings under the NHL By-law Section 9A (By-law 9A).2 8
The parties were unable to agree on a compensation package. As a result, the Red Wings and the Kings appeared before Arbitrator Edward
Houston. The arbitrator held that the Red Wings had to assign McCourt's
contract to the Kings as an equalization payment for the acquisition of
Vachon. 29 Rather than report to the Kings, McCourt brought suit agianst

22. Id. at 500. Judge Higgenbotham did acknowledge the fact that there was a possibility
that some type of player restraint system might be necessary to ensure that a sports league would
operate successfully. IdL at 486.
23. JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM M. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS, 515 (1979). See infra
note 34 and accompanying text regarding option contracts.
24. 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
25. ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM B. GOULD IV & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, 218 (1986).
26. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 1196.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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the Kings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
30
Michigan.
McCourt alleged that the reserve system and, consequently, the assignment of his contract to the Kings violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976).31 McCourt sought injunctive relief, under sections 4 and
10 of the Clayton Act, to prevent the League from enforcing the arbitration
award.

32

The defendants claimed that even if By-law 9A violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the reserve clause was a product of arm's length negotiations
between the NHLPA and the NHL. 3 Consequently, the defendants stated
that they were entitled to the non-statutory labor exemption from antitrust
34

law.

The District Court, after an extensive evidentiary hearing, entered a preliminary injunction restraining the League from sending McCourt to the
Kings. The District Court stated,
[t]he preponderance of evidence.., establishes that by-law 9A was
not the product of bona fide arm's length bargaining over any of its
anticompetitive provisions. The evidence establishes that the by-law
was unilaterally imposed upon the NHLPA and was incorporated
into the collective bargaining agreement in the identical language it
contained when it was first adopted by the League. 5
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit. The appellate court reversed.3 6 The issue on appeal was whether
the District Court had properly applied the standards 37 that were set out in
the Mackey case. 8
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit attempted to reconcile competing antitrust and labor policies. The court developed a three-prong test to determine whether the non-statutory labor exemption was applicable to the
collective bargaining agreement. The following requirements were estab30. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F. 2d
1193 (8th Cir. 1979).
31. McCourt, 460 F. Supp., at 906.
32. Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

lId
Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 910.
McCourt, 600 F. 2d, at 1202-03.
Id. at 1198-1202.

38. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F. 2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). John Mackey

was a tight-end for the Baltimore Colts - who alleged that the "Rozelle Rule" violated the Sherman Act. Id at 609. The "Rozelle Rule" was a restraint which required a franchise signing an
athlete who had played out his option to compensate the athlete's former franchise in the form of
cash, player contracts, or draft choices. Id. at 610-11.
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lished to determine if the exemption applied: the restraint must affect only
parties to the collective bargaining agreement; the agreement sought to be
exempted must concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and
the agreement must be a product of bona fide arm's length bargaining." If
all three requirements are satisfied, the non-statutory exemption applies and
the restraint is not considered an antitrust violation.'
In McCourt, the Eighth Circuit found that the first requirement of the
Mackey test was fulfilled.4 1 The court held that the restraint on trade in
By-law 9A primarily affected the parties to the bargaining relationship. 2 It
is the hockey players themselves who are primarily affected by any restraint, reasonable or not.
The second part of the test revealed that the agreement concerning the
reserve system (also By-law 9A) was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 8(d) of the NationalLabor Relations
43
Act.
At the third stage of the test, the Eighth Circuit's decision in McCourt
reversed the lower court's finding and held that By-law 9A was the product
of bona fide arm's length bargaining.' In reaching their conclusion,
[t]he court recognized that while the NHL owners did not budge on
their insistence upon By-law 9A at least the [o]wner[s] yielded on
other issues such as increased bonus money for players whose teams
finished high in their divisions, and other monetary benefits. The
court disagreed with the trial court's finding that those benefits were
a result of a threat of an antitrust suit to void By-law 9A.4 5
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the NHLPA had fulfilled the arm's length
bona fide element set out in Mackey. "[W]hat the trial court saw as a failure to negotiate was in fact simply the failure to succeed .... This failure
was a part of and not apart from the collective bargaining process, a process
which achieved its ultimate objective of an agreement accepted by the
parties."4 6
Despite the Eighth Circuit's reversal, McCourt maintained his stance
and refused to report to the Kings. Ultimately the Kings and the Red
Wings agreed on an alternative equalization package. The Red Wings sent
39. Id. at 614-15.
40. Id. at 623.
41. McCourt, 600 F.2d, at 1198.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1198 (29 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq.).
44. Id. at 1203.
45. Mark S. Miller The NationalHockey League's Faceoff with Antitrust: McCourt v. California Sports Inc, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 603, 621 (1981).
46. McCourt, 600 F.2d, at 1203.
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a player from their roster and two first round draft choices to the Kings.
Although McCourt lost his case in the appellate court, he was able to continue his career in Detroit. In light of the rulings in PhiladelphiaHockey
and McCourt, it is essential that the NHL and the NHLPA ensure that a
new system of free agency is created within the criteria established by the
Mackey test.
II.

FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

Professional sports leagues have traditionally adopted uncompromising
restrictions that prohibit professional athletes the right to sell their services
to the club of their choice. The early reserve systems granted teams the
right to renew a player's contract in perpetuity. Players signed standard
contracts that bound them to their teams for their careers unless they were
traded, sold, or put on waivers. a7 By resorting to the courts and other
methods of alternative dispute resolution,4" players and rival leagues have
challenged these burdensome restraints.
Every major professional sports league has a player restraint system in
their respective Collective Bargaining Agreement. This part of the paper
will explore the concept of player mobility via free agency in professional
sports. First, an indepth study of the existing free agency system in the
National Hockey League will be conducted. Second, the models of free
agency in the three other major professional sports will be analyzed to determine if the existing system in the NHL is operating effectively.
A.

Free Agency in the National Hockey League

Prior to 1972, free agency was prohibited in the NHL. Eventually, the
players challenged the reserve clause by fleeing to a new rival League, the
WHA. In reaction to the ruling in Philadelphia World Hockey,49 the NHL
Owners responded by replacing the perpetual reserve clause with a one year
option clause in the standard player's contracts. The option system allowing for free agency was first implemented into the 1975 Collective Bargaining Agreement. This new free agent system was held to be a product of
good faith bargaining in McCourt.
47.

PAUL

D.

STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

33, 37

(2d. ed. 1986).
48. In re The Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Professional Baseball Clubs and The
Twelve Clubs Comprising Am. League of-Professional Baseball Clubs, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 101
(1975) (Seitz, Arb.) [hereinafter Messersmith Arbitration].
49. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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In response to the ruling in McCourt, the NHLPA desired to change the
then existing free agent system. During several months of collective bargaining in 1981-1982, the NHL and the NHLPA held differing views on the
issue of free agency. After long intensive negotiations, an agreement was
finalized. Since 1982, the procedure and the rules governing free agency
have evolved and been developed in the 1986 and the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreements.
In the present collective bargaining agreement, 50 a player may become a
free agent, with or without equalization, by playing out his option.51 A new
Club signing a free agent will probably be under an obligation to provide
equalization to the former Club pursuant to By-law 9A.5 2
Under By-law 9A, the players are divided into three groups based upon
the player's age and his length of tenure in the NHL. Group 153 consists of
players who, at the time of becoming a free agent, have neither reached the
age twenty-four nor played five years as a professional. Group II consists of
players who become free agents after either having reached the age of
twenty-four or having played five years as a professional. Group III consists of players who become free agents after having reached age thirty-one.
1. Group I
If the player's Club wants to retain its rights to equalization, the Club
must tender an offer to the player on or before June 30th of the year he
becomes a free agent. 54 In order for the Club to ensure its rights for equalization, the Club must offer the player a specified minimum amount, 5 which

50. 1988 NHL COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at art. I.
51. NHL STANDARD PLAYERS CONTRACT S 18(c)(rev. 1988). A player may elect to sign a
Player's option contract. Id. If so, a player at the end of a fixed term must notify the club by
September 10th that he wishes to sign a player's option contract. Id The player will play the
next season at his previous year's salary. Id. Upon next July 1, he becomes a free agent, possibly
subject to equalization. Id.
Another way a player can become a free agent without equalization is at the end of a termination contract. 1988 NHL COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 1, at Exhibit 10 (Standard Termination Contract).
52. NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE BY-LAW, § 9A [hereinafter § 9A] (§ 9A pertains to free
agents and equalization).
53. Id. The parameters of Groups I, II and III are established in §'9A. Id.
54. Id. at § 9A.8(a).
55. Id. § 9A.8(a) provides for minimum amounts:
1988 - minimum amount $110,000 per year;
1989 - minimum amount $115,000 per year;
1990 - minimum amount $120,000 per year;
1991 - minimum amount $125,000 per year.
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is subject to salary arbitration. This offer must remain open for acceptance
until July 31st.
If a Group I free agent signs with another Club, the new Club must
provide an equalization payment to the old Club. If a mutual agreement
cannot be reached, the Clubs involved must submit their respective proposals to neutral arbitration.5 6 The arbitrator will then select, "without
change," one of the proposals submitted to him. His decision shall be final
and not subject to review. 7 The Clubs' proposals must be limited to players, draft choices, or, in the last resort, cash. Thus, in order to sign a Group
I free agent, the equalization payment will be substantial.
Ia.

Group I Example

In July, 1991, Brendan Shanahan, a fourth year professional and
twenty-two years of age, became the third Group I free agent to change
teams in the prior five years.5 Shanahan, a rugged winger, signed a lucrative one year contract with the St. Louis Blues (Blues). In the 1990-1991
season, Shanahan's last season with the New Jersey Devils (Devils), he accumulated twenty-nine goals and thirty-seven assists for a total of sixty-six
points.
Pursuant to By-aw Section 9A, the Blues and the Devils had 72 hours
to mutually agree on the equalization payment. Failing a mutual agreement, the Blues and the Devils had to submit their respective proposals to a
neutral arbitrator who must select, without change, one of the proposals.
The purpose of the Group I formula is to allow a Club who loses a player to
replace that player with a player of similar talent. Shanahan was thought to
be an attractive acquisition for the Blues because they believed they would
not have to relinquish a high scoring player as equalization. 59
On Friday, August 30th, 1991, the Blues General Manager, Ron Caron
(Caron), and the Devils General Manager, Lou Lamerillo (Lamerillo),
presented their proposals to the arbitrator, Judge Edward Houston. Caron
put forth a package that included forward Rod Brind' Amour, goalie Curtis
56. Id. at § 9A.8(c).
57. Id. at § 9A.8(d). The validity of the arbitration equalization provision was upheld on an
interlocutory basis by the Circuit Court in McCourt, 600 F. 2d, at 1203.
58. The two other players were: Gary Nylund, who signed with the Chicago Black Hawks.
His former team, the Toronto Maple Leafs, received Ken Yaremehuck, Jerome Dupont, and a
draft choice; Brian Curran signed with the New York Islanders. His former team, the Boston
Bruins, received Paul Boutiler.
59. Shanahan as a scoring leader compared to two other NHL stars:
Brett Hull
131 points
Adam Oates
115 points
Brendan Shanahan
66 points
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Joseph, and future third and fourth round draft choices. The Devils put
forth a request for all-star defenseman, Scott Stevens. Stevens, a bona fide
all-star signed with the Blues as a Group II free agent in July 1990.
Seventy-two hours later, Scott Stevens was a member of the Devils. The
arbitrator decided that the Blues should relinquish Stevens, a twenty-seven
year old all-star defenseman, for Shanahan a twenty-two year old forward.
"The decision touched off a torrent of protest from Stevens, who said he
Shanahan stated that it appeared the League was
might not report ....
agent log jam by
deliberately obstructing the Blues from breaking the free
' 61
signing himself and Stevens, which drove salaries up.
The effects of this decision will have an enormous impact on how teams
will approach the Group I free agent system. "There was not a General
Manager in the League who would have made the swap if it were an actual
trade." 62 Prior to the Shanahan signing, teams were reluctant to utilize this
procedure. The result of this decision will effectively chill the system.
In 1991, there were four other Group I free agents who have signed
contracts with new Clubs. The Chicago Black Hawks (Black Hawks)
signed defenseman Bryan Marchment to a two year contract worth approximately $600,000.00.63 The Boston Bruins (Bruins) signed defenseman
Glen Featherstone to a three year contract worth approximately
$700,000.00.6 The New York Rangers signed Adam Graves and the Detroit Red Wings signed Troy Crowder.
Despite the brief flurry of signings, it is evident that the Group I
formula is ineffective. Players such as Bruins' defenseman Glen Wesley,
Montreal Canadiens' Defenseman Mathieu Schneider, Pittsburgh Penguins'
forward Mark Recchi and other bona fide all stars were Group I free agents
in 1991. However, none of these free agents received any substantial offers
from other Clubs.

60. Scott Stevens was the first significant Group II free agent ever to move under the current
system. For a complete report on the Stevens signing, see infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text.
61. Scott Morrison, No Justicefor St. Louis, TORONTO SUN, Sept. 4, 1991, at 73.
62. Id.; see infra notes 223-238 and accompanying text regarding Shanahan arbitration.
63. Marchment has played in 37 career NHL games for the Winnipeg Jets.
64. It is interesting to note that both the Marchment signing and the Featherstone signing
were situations wherein their former clubs received rights to free agents as equalization. The
Bruins signed Group I Featherstone and Group II David Thomlinson, both former members of
the St. Louis Blues. The St. Louis Blues signed Group III David Christian and Ron Hoover
(Termination Contract). In the Marchment signing, the Hawks sent Group II Free Agent Troy
Murray and Warren Rychel (not a Free Agent) to Winnipeg. In acquiring Murray, the Jets were
taking a risk that they could sign him.
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Undoubtedly there are Clubs who could afford to sign free agents and
desperately need these free agents to help their Clubs become economically
and competitively balanced. Clubs refuse to participate in the free agent
market. As a result, these players will not realize their true market potential and will be forced to resign contracts with their present Clubs. Thus,
although Group I free agency exists on paper, in reality, the utilization of
this framework for free agency is a rarity.
2.

Group II

The equalization payment structure for Group II free agents is different
from Group I. Equalization for Group II players is calculated on the salary
that the new Club has offered the free agent. Furthermore, the former Club
may preserve an additional right of first refusal.65
The former Club, has a right of first refusal if its offer to the player prior
66
to July 1st, provides for a minimum 15% raise over his previous contract.
The new Club signing the free agent must provide to the former Club a
copy of its offer sheet. The former Club then has seven days to match the
offer sheet. If it decides not to match the offer, the former Club is entitled
to an equalization payment.6 7
The equalization payment for Group II players is calculated on the salary that the free agent receives from the new Club. There are seven categories involved.6 ' For each category there is a predetermined equalization
which is in the form of draft choices and cash.

65. Supra note 52, at § 9A.8(m).
66. Id at § 9A.8(h).
If a player is in the Group II category, the club must meet a fixed amount in order to retain
the right of first refusal. Id For example:
1988 - minimum amount $110,000 per year
1989 - minimum amount $115,000 per year
1990 - minimum amount $120,000 per year
1991 - minimum amount $125,000 per year.

Id
67. Id. at § 9A.8(m).
68. Id. at § 9A.8(p).
Categories and equalization payments per category shall be as follows:

Playing

Category

Season

of Offer

87-88; 88-89

(i)

Equalization Payment
under 110,000

89-90

under 115,000

90-91
91-92

under 120,000
under 125,000

None
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2a. Group II Example
It seems inviting for a Club to relinquish future draft choices for a bona
fide proven all-star. However, the Group II formula operates in a manner
that deters Clubs from signing Group II free agents. In general, Clubs are
in fear of losing their "prized draft choices" unless the Club in question is
the St. Louis Blues.
In July 1990, the Blues stunned the hockey world by re-signing Brett
Hull. The Blues, on the eve of Hull becoming a Group II free agent, resigned their seventy-two goal scorer to a multi-year, multi-million dollar
contract.
Two weeks later, the Blues stunned the hockey world again. The Blues
signed all-star defenseman Scott Stevens, formerly a member of the 'Washington Capitals (Capitals) to a multi-year, multi-million dollar offer sheet.
Under the Group II formula, the Capitals had two options: exercise
their right to match the offer or receive equalization in the form of draft
choices. 69 The Capitals selected the latter alternative and opted to receive
five future draft choice selections from the Blues.

87-88;
89-90
90-91
91-92
87-88;
89-90
90-91
91-92
87-88;
89-90
90-91
91-92
87-88;
89-90
90-91
91-92
87-88;
89-90
90-91
91-92

88-89

(ii)

88-89

(iii)

88-89

(iv)

88-89

(v)

88-89

(vi)

110,000 to 134,999
115,000 to 139,999
120,000 to 144,999
125,000 to 149,999
135,000 to 159,999
140,000 to 164,999
145,000 to 169,999
150,000 to 174,999
160,000 to 209,000
165,000 to 214,999
170,000 to 219,999
175,000 to 224,999
210,000 to 259,999
215,000 to 264,999
220,000 to 269,999
225,000 to 274,999
260,000 to 399,999
265,000 to 399,999
270,000 to 399,999
275,000 to 399,999
400,000 or more

3rd round pick

2nd & 3rd round picks

1st round pick

1st & 2nd round picks

$100,000 cash plus two 1st round
draft picks one of which must be
one of top 11 draft picks

$100,000 cash plus two 1st round
picks, each of which must be one
of top 7 draft picks.
Id. If the new club cannot deliver the first round picks as required for high salaried players it
shall, in addition to the two (2) first round picks and $100,000, give to the old club its next three
first round picks. Id. at § 9A.8(o).
69. See id. at § 9A.8(p).
(vii)
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Scott Stevens has been the only significant Group II signee in the last
five years. The Blues were willing to part with unknown draft choices for a
bona fide all-star.7"
In the summer of 1991, the following notable players were Group II free
agents: John Cullen, Ron Francis, Ed Belfour (Vezina Trophy winner),
Craig Simpson, Steve Smith, Esa Tikkanen, Sean Burke and Kevin Stevens.
These star players played out their options with the intentions of attracting
offers from many teams.
As of the date of this publication, the only significant offers these players have received are from the Clubs they played for last season. It is evident that the Group II formula does not operate effectively. General
Managers refuse to sign free agents in fear of losing their "prized" draft
choices.
3.

Group III

Group III free agents are players who are thirty-one years or older.
Former Clubs wishing to maintain their rights to equalization must offer
the player a contract on or before June 30th. Any such offer must include:
at least a 15% salary increase over the player's salary during the prior year;
a minimum salary of $110,000 per year, subject to salary arbitration; and
the offer must remain open for acceptance until July 31.71 Once a player
has played out his option, the Group III free agent has the burden of selecting his old Club's equalization rights. They will be either: the right of first
refusal or, the right to equalization as calculated in Group I, however, the
equalization would be restricted to draft choices and cash.
3a. Group III Example
This method of free agency was used by Larry Robinson, a veteran
defenseman for the Montreal Canadiens. Robinson became a free agent in
the summer of 1989. The Kings tendered Robinson a multi-year deal that
was very lucrative. Robinson granted the Canadians the "right of first refusal." The Canadians chose not to exercise that right. Thus, Robinson left
"La Belle Province" for the "Sunset Strip" of Hollywood, California.
70. The impact the Hull and Stevens signings had on the economic and competitive balance
of the Blues will be discussed in the last part of the paper. Infra notes 223-238 and accompanying
text. The loss of Stevens as compensation in the Shanahan arbitration will also be discussed. See
id
71. By-Law, supra note 52, at § 9A.8(q). If the club does not offer at least 15% raise there is
no equalization. Id.
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In the summer of 1991, the following players were among the Group III
free agents: Guy Carbonneau (Montreal Canadians), Neal Broten ( Minnesota North Stars), David Christian (Boston Bruins), Charlie Huddy72 (Los
Angeles Kings), Rod Langway (Washington Capitals), Brian Trottier
(Pittsburgh Penguins), and Michel Goulet (Chicago Black Hawks). Only
Christian, Goulet and Huddy attracted significant interest from other
Clubs.
Christian signed a lucrative three year contract with the Blues worth a
reported $1.6 million. The Boston Bruins declined to match the offer. As a
result, Christian became a member of the Blues.7 3
Charlie Huddy, who earned $200,000.00 (Canadian) in the 1990-1991
season, received a lucrative offer from the Philadelphia Flyers. The offer
was for four years, worth an estimated 2.4 million dollars. The Kings exercised their right to match this offer and resigned Huddy.
The Huddy resigning is an example of how NHL Clubs have been suppressing salaries for years. Despite being a member of five Stanley Cup
winning teams for the 1980's, the Edmonton Oilers valued Huddy at
$200,000.00 a year in the 1990-1991 season. By exercising his rights to free
agency, Huddy was able to sign a lucrative contract. 74
Michel Goulet, a thirty-one year old forward with the Chicago Black
Hawks (Hawks), received an offer sheet from the Blues. Goulet was offered
a four year package worth an estimated $2.4 million. The Hawks, feeling
the pressure from their divisional rivals, matched the offer. If not for the
Blues, Goulet may never have received an offer of such magnitude from the
Hawks.
However, there are players who did not receive any offers from other
Clubs. Guy Carbonneau, a two time Frank J. Selke Trophy 75 winner was
forced to resign with the Canadiens.
Neal Broten received no offers from other Clubs and was forced to leave
the NHL. Broten, who scored thirteen goals and had fifty-six assists last
72. Huddy played 11 seasons with the Edmonton Oilers. After playing out his option with
the Oilers, Huddy was left unprotected in the League's dispersal draft. The Minnesota North
Stars claimed him and traded his rights to the Los Angeles Kings.
73. The Bruins filed tampering charges against the Blues, claiming Christian was not a free
agent. While the League was investigating the charge, the Bruins proceeded to sign free agents
Featherstone and Thomlinson. Prior to an arbitration hearing on Christian's status, the Blues and
the Bruins reached an accord to their disagreement. The Blues waived their equalization rights to
Featherstone and Thomlinson.
74. Steve Smith, Esa Tikkanen, Craig Simpson, all Group II free agents and former teammates of Huddy's are currently negotiating with the Oilers. These players should utilize the
Huddy signing as a minimum and negotiate from that position.
75. Awarded to the player who is the best defensive forward in the League.
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season while recording nine goals and thirteen assists in twenty-three playoff games, signed a one year contract with a German based team.
North Stars General Manager, Bob Clarke, said he was perplexed,"...
(Broten) is a special player for this team, I think we were very generous.
Where do you draw the line?"7 6 Broten's agent, Ron Simon, admitted that
his client would earn more money with the North Stars, but he stated:
"their [the North Stars] offer is not fair in comparison to players of similar
experience and ability. This is a matter of principle.""
Group III free agents have the most freedom to negotiate and sign with
other Clubs in the League. However, the fact that a player must walt until
he is thirty-one years or older is a serious impediment to players from utilizing this procedure. The average span of a NHL career is 3-5 years.7 8 The
average NHL career ends far before a player attains the age of 31. Therefore, an overwhelming number of players will never have the opportunity to
utilize this free agency procedure.
4. A Note on Collusion - Does it exist in the NHL?
Neal Broten did not receive any legitimate offers from any other Clubs,
nor did Steve Smith, Craig Simpson, and Guy Carbonneau. The list goes
on. Ron Simon, agent for Broten, stated: "[w]e are very surprised . . .
which makes me wonder if it's collusion exclusive of St. Louis. Why is St.
Louis making offers and no one else?" 79 The Sports Industry News reports:
...collusion charges against the NHL are being considered by several player agents .... Of course, concern about a collusion charge
is not unanimous among NHL Owners. Some Clubs are convinced
the agents' threat is little more than a preliminary negotiating gambit designed to extract the best possible opening contract offers ....
The [e]lubs could be in an uncomfortable position this summer. If
they don't show a willingness to bear the compensation burden they
largely created, the union will have strong evidence that free agency
rules are fundamentally unfair. Even if a few key players change
teams, agents will be looking for evidence that the moves were stage
managed to create the appearance of open competition.8 0

76.
77.
78.
79.

Kevin Allen, Broten might be boundfor Berlin, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 1991, at 2C.
Id. Broten eventually returned to Minnesota and resigned with the Stars.
The average career of a player in the NHL is 3-5 years. NHLPA (1982).
Allen, supra note 76.

80. Collusion ChargesEyed by Some NHL Agents, 9 SPORTS INDUSTRY NEWS, PUB. No. 29,

227 (July 19, 1991).
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Conclusion

Prima facie, player mobility via free agency exists in the NHL. However, the system is seldom utilized by the Clubs in the League. The reason
is that the form of equalization that a club would have to relinquish if it
signs a free agent is far too onerous. Consequently, Clubs are deterred from
signing free agents. Thus, in reality, the system of free agency in the NHL
is ineffective.
In order to develop a system of free agency that encourages player mobility in the NHL, it is necessary to examine the concept of free agency in
other professional sports. In this way, one can determine what models of
free agency encourage player mobility and, just as importantly, what models deter mobility.
B.

Free Agency in ProfessionalFootball

The antitrust cases in football"1 sent a message to the Owners regarding
the issue of player mobility. The 1977 and the 1982, National Football
League (NFL) Collective Bargaining Agreements are, however, two of the
most ineffective agreements in professional sports for encouraging player
mobility via free agency."
The last Collective Bargaining Agreement between the players and
Owners in the NFL was in 1982. That Agreement is still considered to be
the agreement governing the NFL/NFLPA relationship even though the
Agreement expired in 1987.83 However, on May 28, 1991, Federal Judge
David Doty, of the U.S. District Court in Minnesota, ruled for the NFL
players who challenged the NFL's restriction on veteran free agents.
In an action brought by eight NFL players, Doty ruled that the
NFL is no longer immune from challenge under antitrust laws.
Judge Doty's decision clears the way for players challenging the
League's restrictions on free agency.
81. Mackey v. National Football League, 543, F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
82. BERRY, et al., supra note 25, at 109, 110. With the decision in Mackey - the NFL players
were able to become free agents by playing out their options with a barrier of compensation penalty to the new team no longer in the way. Mackey, 543 F.2d, at 622-23. The National Football
League Players Association, however, bargained away the rights won in the courtroom and agreed
to a new procedure for determining compensation payment for signing free agents.
Prior to 1976, professional football possessed the same reserve system as other professional
sports.
83. See generally, Lock, supra note 7, at 347. In Powell v. National Football League, 888
F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), the court ruled that the NFL and the players have not yet reached the
point of impasse where it would be appropriate to permit action under the Sherman Act.
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Judge Doty issued his ruling in a suit filed by Freeman McNeil,
Don Majkowski, Mark Collins, Irvin Eatman, Tim McDonald, Niko
Noga, Davie Richards and Lee Rouson. The McNeil suit, as it is
called, claimed that, since the NFLPA renounced its status as a
union in November of 1989, the players were free of the restrictions
which the NFLPA agreed to in the five year Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed in 1982.
NFLPA Executive Director Gene Upshaw said,
This is a huge victory for the players and it proves that the
players made the right decision when they voted to end collective bargaining after the Powell decision. As we've always said,
the NFL can run, but it can't hide. The Clubs must now face
treble damages for unlawfully restricting players over the past
two years.
In Powell v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
NFL was exempt from antitrust challenges to its free agency system
only so long as the players were represented by a union. Soon after
the Powell ruling, the NFLPA renounced its status as a union, clearing the way for the McNeil case. The McNeil case was filed in April
of 1989, and it has been financed by the NFLPA since its inception.
Richard Berthelsen, NFLPA General Counsel, said Judge
Doty's ruling for the players could have an impact far beyond the
free agency rules. If the free agency rules are no longer protected,
the draft rules aren't either. The NFL faces some tough days in
court in the future.8 4
"The NFL appealed the McNeil case. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
denied the NFL's appeal of Judge David Doty's recent ruling ending the
NFL's labor exemption for restrictions on veteran free agent players in McNeil v. NFL." 5
The 1982 Agreement contained a right of first refusal compensation procedure. Under this procedure, a team preserved specified rights to a player
even after the contract between the player and the team expired.8 6 When a
player's contractual relationship with a team has terminated, the player has
the freedom to negotiate with other teams in the NFL." If a player accepts

84. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, QUICK COUNT, FASTBREAK-

ING NEWS FROM THE NFLPA, PUB. No. 2 (1991).
85. NATIONAL FOOTBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION MEDIA RELEASE, NFL Loses Bid to Over-

turn Judge Doty's Decision Ending Antitrust Exemption (June 13, 1991).
86. 1982 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL
LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE MANAGEMENT

COUNCIL, Art. XV (Dec. 11, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 NFL COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT].

87. Id at Art. XV, § 1-2.
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an offer from another team, 8 the player's original team has one of two
options: the team can either match the salary offered to the player by the
other team and retain that player;8 9 or the team can receive a draft choice
compensation from the other team. 90 The compensation for a particular
player is based upon the new team's offer and the number of the years the
player has played in the NFL.
Ethan Lock 9 ' argues that this procedure has raised the "price" to the
new team of obtaining a particular player's services to a level that has completely deterred the movement of players under this system. In support of
this argument, Lock cites the case of Powell v. NFL. 92 In Powell, evidence
revealed that of the 1,415 players who became veteran free agents under the
1982 Agreement, only one player received an offer from another Club.9 3
In 1987, the 1982 NFL/NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement expired. Negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were unsuccessful. However, the NFL maintained the right of first refusal/
compensation provided in the 1982 Agreement during the 1987 and 1988
seasons.
On February 1, 1989, the NFL Management Committee unilaterally
implemented a new system to operate in conjunction with the original system. 94 The new system was labelled: Plan-B. Under the Plan-B system
each team is allowed to protect 37 players. 95 The protected players still
remain subject to the right of first refusal/compensation system. The players that are left unprotected become unfettered free agents and they are free
to negotiate with any of the 28 Clubs in the NFL. "From February 2 to
April 1, teams may sign players left unprotected by other clubs, with no
draft pick compensation required."9 6 The rights of unprotected players
who do not sign a contract with a new team revert back to the old team on
97
April 1st.
88. Id. at § 3.
89. Id. at §4.
90. Id. at § 12.
91. Lock, supra note 7, at 347.
92. 678 F. Supp. 777, 779-81 (D.Minn. 1988).
93. Id. at 781 n.6. The player who received the offer was Brent Boyd of Minnesota. Lock,
supra note 7, at 347 n.44. He received an offer from the San Diego Chargers in 1983. Id. The
offer was ultimately matched by Minnesota. IaL
94. Lock, supra note 7, at 347.
95. Plan B-the ABC's, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 1990, at 3C.
96. Id.
97. Id. Plan-B has instituted a limit on the amount of players a team is able to sign. The top
10 teams in the 1989 standings may sign up to maximum of 15 Plan B free agents. The middle
nine teams can sign no more than 25 'Plan B' free agents. The bottom nine teams are not limited.
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A report98 released by the NFLPA summarizes the results of Plan B for
the 1989 and 1990 seasons. The following was reported.
Over 1,100 players have been deemed unrestricted under Plan B.
Almost a third changed Clubs each year. Those 413 players changing Clubs negotiated contracts with averages per year 61% higher
than their previous contract series. Virtually all received a signing
bonus; the average value was $48,000.00. That average rose 40% in
1990 - from $40,000.00 in 1989 to $57,500.00 in 1990.
Just a limited ability to change Clubs accorded those 1,100 players has meant more competitive play. In 1989, according to a NFL
press release, 17 teams - the most ever -were still in Super Bowl
contention entering the season's final weekend. By the 14th week of
the 1990 season, all 14 NFL teams had a change to get into the
augmented playoffs - and it went down to the final minute of the
season's last game to determine the final wild card team. Club personnel emulate what they perceive as innovative steps by peers on
winners. If a winning Club starts holding many minicamps, soon, so
are other Clubs. Let another "winner" emphasize strength programs, again, soon so do others. So, when front office personnel saw
Green Bay and Kansas City sign many unrestricted players and then
become "winners" in 1989, no one should have been surprised when
almost 200 unrestricted players signed with new Clubs in 1990. 9
In summary, statistics reveal that Plan-B was a success for the Plan-B
players and Clubs. However, the top 37 protected players on each team are
still subject to a right of first refusal/compensation system and, as a result,
there is no movement amongst those players.
C. Free Agency in the NationalBasketball Association
On April 26th, 1988, the National Basketball Association (NBA), and
the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), reached an agreement on a new six year labor contract that will extend through the 19931994 season." °° A description of the NBA free agency system follows.
NBA teams retain the right of first refusal I0 1 at the end of each players
initial contract, or at the end of a negotiated extension of the original con98. M.J. Duberstein, Plan B UnrestrictedPlayers: The Two Year Record, SIGNALS, Pub. No.
1, National Football League Players Association 18 (Winter 1990-91).
99. Id.
100. 1988 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (Nov. 1, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT].
101. Id. at Art. V, § 3(a)-(0. Basically the right of first refusal operates as follows. Once a

veteran becomes a free agent he is able to receive offers from any teams in the league. Id. at § 2.
If he receives an offer, he must present the offer to his former team. Id. at § 5. The former team
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tract. The right of first refusal was no longer applicable to a player who, as
of the 1987-1998 season,"°2 had been subject to the right of first refusal for
six years.10 3 The time period was reduced to four years beginning in the
1988-1989 season and will reduce to three years in the 1993-1994, the final
year of the agreement." 4 Therefore, players who have completed seven
years of service in the League (at the end of the 1987-1988 season) or five
years (as of the 1989 season) or four years (as of the 1993-1994 season), and
are concluding at least their second contract, will become unrestricted free
agents and will not be subject to the right of first refusal. In order to retain
the right of first refusal for "restricted" players who do not have enough
years of service or who have just completed their first contract, a team must
tender a one year contract for at least 125% of the players previous
10 5
salary.
The NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement possesses some unique and
innovative features that directly affect player mobility via free agency.
The NBA is the only major professional sports League that does not
provide compensation to the former Club of the free agent." ° This feature
combined with the right of first refusal had a chilling effect on the free agent
10 7
market.
Player agent, Ted Steinberg, made this statement pertaining to the 1983
Agreement:
Due to the fact that former teams are not compensated by the
new club when the prior club loses a veteran free agent, it is extremely unlikely that a prior club would fail to match any offer that
was made by a new club unless the amount of the offer is so high
that the prior team couldn't afford to match the offer, or the new
club felt that it was grossly overpaying the player. The possibility of
either of these circumstances existing is extremely remote because of
the restrictions on funds that a club can spend because the salary cap
eliminates the first reason and the virtual uniformity of player evaluation eliminates the second reason.10 8
then must decide within a certain amount of time whether to match the offer of the other team or
let the player sign the offer sheet of the other team. Id at § 5(a)-(b).
102. The season being the 1987/88 season.
103. 1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 100, at Art. V.
104. Id. at § I(a)(1) (Years of Service).
105. Id. at § 3(b).
106. Ted Steinberg, Negotiating NationalBasketball Association Contracts,in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, § 7.07, at 7-20. (G. Uberstein ed. 1988).

107. Id.
108. Id. This statement was made before the 1988 collective bargaining agreement was in
place. The statement is still very much applicable to a "restricted" free agent.
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In the 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the above problem was
rectified. No longer will an unrestricted veteran free agent be subject to the
right of first refusal. Therefore, the unrestricted free agents will have advanced mobility potential throughout the League.
The implementation of the salary cap and the revenue sharing program
in the NBA Collective Agreement has had a direct impact on player mobility via free agency.10 9 The salary cap was implemented in the 1983 Agreement. It operates such that individual teams are limited to the amount of
money they are able to spend on player salaries. When the cap first came
into existence, the teams were able to have a maximum combined team salary equal to the greater of a fixed amount or 53% of Defined Gross Revenues divided by the number of teams in the NBA as of July 31st of each
year.1 10, The 1983 and the 1988 agreements provide that individual teams
shall be permitted to exceed this salary cap to the extent of its current contractual commitments in certain circumstances. One critical exception is
when a team wishes to re-sign their own respective free agent to a salary
that will cause the signing team to exceed the limit. An example of how the
restricted free agent system in the NBA operates is as follows.
In 1990, John "Hot Rod" Williams of the Cleveland Cavaliers (Cleveland) was one of the sixty restricted free agents. As a free agent, he signed a
seven year offer sheet worth an estimated $26.7 million with the Miami
Heat. Cleveland exercised its right to match the offer. As a result, Wil109. The framework of the Salary Cap and Revenue Sharing will be discussed in this part of
the paper. Infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text. The impact that the Salary Cap system
has on the competitive balance in the league will be discussed in a latter part. Infra notes 130-151
and accompanying text.
110. 1988 NBA Coll. Barg. Agreement, supra note 100 at Art. VII Part D, § 1. The salary
cap and the minimum team salary is described in Part D:
COMPUTATION OF SALARY CAP

Section 1. For each season during the term of this Agreement, there shall be a Salary Cap.
The Salary Cap shall be equal to the greater of:
(a) $6.7 million in 1988-89
$7.4 million in 1989-90
$8.1 million in 1990-91

$8.9 million in 1991-92
$9.8 million in 1992-93
$10.8 million in 1993-94
or
(b) 53% of Defined Gross Revenues, less 4.3 DGR, plus or minus any adjustments pursuant to Sections 3(b) and 4 below, divided by the number of Teams in the NBA as of July 31
of each year other than Expansion Teams that have not completed three full seasons.

Id. at Art. VII, Part D, § l(a), (b). The NBA payroll cap is scheduled to increase to $12.6 million
in the 1991-92 season. NBA SalariesJust Miss $1 Million Average, SPORTS INDUSTRY NEWs,
PUB. No. 17, 130 (APRIL 26, 1991).
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liams became the highest paid player in the NBA. 111 Only one restricted
free agent, Johnny Newman, switched teams. 112 Of the thirty-six unrestricted free agents in 1990, twelve players switched teams.
It is still too early to determine whether the system of free agency in the
NBA has been successful for both parties involved. This rather innovative
and unique structure was given a "vote of confidence" when the owners and
players reached a new agreement in 1988.113
D.

Free Agency in ProfessionalBaseball

Prior to 1976, the reserve system reigned supreme in Major League
Baseball. Baseball players were not free to negotiate with other Clubs, but
were bound to "their" Club under the reserve system. Since players could
not leave their Club for another, their only leverage in salary negotiation
was to hold out or threaten to retire.1 14 Therefore, the reserve clause enabled the owners to control players' salaries to a point where the players
were not receiving their true market value.
After unsuccessful attempts in the courts,1 15 the players resorted to alternative dispute resolution and successfully challenged the reserve system
in Major League Baseball. 1 6 As a result, the players were able to collectively bargain for a free agent system. In the 1976 Collective Bargaining
Agreement, free agency came into existence in Major League Baseball. The
free agency framework was developed in the 1976 Agreement and significantly altered in the 1981, 1985, and 1990 Agreements.
The current rules governing free agency are set out in Article XVIII of
the 1990 Collective Bargaining Agreement.' 17 Major League Baseball players are able to become free agents after they have completed six or more
111. David DuPree, FacingIncome Facts - Debate About NBA PayHeats Up - PlayersLikely
to Encourage Lifting of the Cap, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 1991, at IC.
112. Interview with David Mondross, National Basketball Players Association.
113. There have been some rumblings that the NBPA has become disenchanted with the
Salary Cap. See infra notes 206-214, and accompanying text.
114. In re Arbitration Between Major League Baseball Players Association and the 26 Major
League Baseball Club, Grievance No. 87-3 (Aug. 31 1988)(Nicolau, Arb.) [hereinafter Collusion
II].
115. Flood v. Kuhn 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356
(1953).
116. Messersmith Arbitration, supra note 30; see Glenn M. Wong, A Survey of Grievance
Arbitration Cases in Major League Baseball, 41 THE ARBITRATION JOURNAL, 42-63 (March
1986) (analysis and survey of other arbitration cases regarding professional baseball players).
117. BAsic AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE AM. LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS
AND MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (Jan. 1, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 BASEBALL COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT].
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years of Major League service."1 A player who is eligible for free agency
must file for free agency within fifteen days preceding the final game of the
World Series. 1 9 The player must notify the Players' Relations Committee
of his election to declare free agency. Once this is done, the player is able to
negotiate with any team in Major League Baseball. 120
The free agent's former Club may attempt to re-sign the player. The
team may offer salary arbitration to the player.121 If the team fails to offer
salary arbitration, the team will be unable to negotiate with the player or
22
sign the player until the following May 1st.1
The Club signing a free agent must compensate the former team by assigning its draft choice in the Regular Phase of the next June Major League
Rule 4 Amateur Player Draft.'2 3 The form of compensation that a Club
must relinquish in baseball is not as onerous as in other professional
leagues. It takes several years for an amateur to break into the Major
Leagues, and coupled with the fact that so few players make the Majors,
Clubs believe that an amateur draft pick is worth giving up in return for a
bona fide Major Leaguer.
From a player's perspective, free agency has been an overwhelming success. A player of six or more years experience does not have to continue
playing for the same team throughout his entire career. The advent of an
effective system of free agency has enabled the players an opportunity to sell
their talents to all Clubs. From 1976 to 1983, Clubs actively sought out free
agents in the hope that by acquiring a multi-talented veteran their respective Clubs would win the World Series. "More or less, players began to be
paid their expected net contribution to club revenues."' 2 4
Economist Gerald Scully conducted a salary survey which revealed that
since the Messersmith arbitration decision, player salaries have increased
118. Id. at Art. XX, § B(1).
119. Id. at § B(2)(a).
120. Id.
121. Id. at § B(3)(Rights of Former Club to Sign Free Agent).
122. Once a player becomes a free agent he shall not be eligible to become a free agent until
he has completed an additional 5 years of Major League service. Id at § D(1)(Reporter RightsFree Agent).
123. Id. at § B(4)(a)-(c)(Free Agency-Compensation). The 1988 Baseball Agreement states
in regard to compensation to the free agent's former club:
The former club of a Player who: (i) became a free agent under this Section B; and (ii)
ranks as a Type A, B, or C Player as defined below, shall be entitled to receive compensation subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c) below. Such compensation shall consist
solely of... amateur draft choices ...

Id. at § B(4)(a).
124. GERALD

succeeding the Player's election of free agency.

W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

153 (1989).
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dramatically.25 During the period of 1951 to 1975, player salaries in-

creased from $13,300.00 to $46,000.00 - a compounded growth rate of
5.3%.126 In 1950, Clubs had revenues of $2 million on average. In 197778,127 player salaries nearly doubled, while Club revenues increased about
35%. From 1979 to 1984, player salaries were escalating 25% per year,
while Club revenues rose about 15% per annum. x28 Since 1982, there has
been a decrease in the growth of player remuneration. 129 In 1987, average
salaries declined compared to 1986, although they recovered in 1988 and
continued to rise in 1989. Thus, the implementation of a free agent system
has had a direct effect on the escalation of player salaries in Major League

Baseball.
125. Idi
126. Id at 152-153. The following table highlights the Major League Average Player
salaries.
YEAR

AVERAGE PLAYER
SALARY

PERCENTAGE
CHANGE

1951
13,300
1967
19,000
1975
46,000
5.3*
1976
51,500
12.0
1977
76,066
47.7
1978
99,876
31.3
1979
113,558
13.7
1980
143,756
26.6
1981
185,651
29.1
1982
241,497
30.1
1983
291,108
20.5
1984
329,408
13.2
1985
371,157
12.7
1986
410,517
10.6
1987
402,094
-2.1
1988
449,826
11.9
497,254
1989
1990
597,537
* This figure is for the compound growth rate for player
salaries from 1951 through 1975.
Id. (giving 1951-1988 salary figures and citing H.R. REP. No. 2002, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
110(1952). Murray Chass, Shortstop Costs Yankees Salary Title in Battle Against Mets, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987, § 5, at 3); From the diamond to gold, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 1989, at 3C
(giving 1989 salary figures); MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION (1991).
127. Scully, supra note 124, at 152.
128. Id. at 152-53.
129. The decline in the average salaries is directly attributable to the owners collusive activities. It was ruled in Collusion I and Collusion II that the owners 'acted in concert' with respect to
those players who became free agents following the 1985 and 1986 seasons by not tendering any
offers to free agents until the former clubs stated they were no longer interested. This is precisely
the result forbidden in Article XVIII(H) of the Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Collusion II, supra note 114, at No. 87-3.

1991]

NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Furthermore, it will be shown in the next part of this paper that free
agency in Major League Baseball has created a more competitively balanced League which has proven to have a direct effect on the escalation of
Club revenues. Therefore, from both a player's and owner's perspective,
free agency in Major League Baseball has been a success.
E.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the models of free agency in the four major
professional sports, manifests that the most liberalized free agent system
can be found in Major League Baseball, whereas the most restrictive systems can be found in the National Football League and the National
Hockey League.
It will be repeatedly asserted throughout this paper that the NHL must
become more competitively balanced. Furthermore, it will be asserted that
in order to achieve such a goal, the NHL and the NHLPA must implement
a less restrictive form of free agency. Thus, it is necessary to outline what is
meant by a less restrictive form of free agency.
A less restrictive form of free agency must provide for greater freedom
of movement amongst the League's veteran players. Clubs must actively
seek out free agents and sign them to contracts. The form of equalization
that a team must relinquish must not be so burdensome that it will deter a
team from signing a free agent. A more intricate revenue sharing scheme
and a salary cap system should be created to ensure that all teams in the
League will be economically and competitively balanced. The issues of a
revenue sharing schemes and a salary cap system will be dealt with in the
latter part of this paper.
III.

COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS

"The [R]eserve [S]ystem [in the National Hockey League] prevents
deterioration in competitive balance among the NHL teams, thereby
allowing the presentation
of an attractive form of competitive
13 0
entertainment."
John Ziegler, 1979
"If the players are going to come out and demand free agency for
free agency's sake, you've got a real problem ....It does not relate
to business, it doesn't relate to how you run the sport. Our system
130. McCourt v. Calfornia Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193-94 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979) (John Ziegler,
President of the National Hockey League, testifying, concerning the objectives of the National
Hockey League's version of the reserve system).
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helps keep competitive parity; that's why the system has strong sup'
port from the teams." 131
John Ziegler, 1991
Despite Mr. Ziegler's views, only seven teams in the NHL have won the
Stanley Cup since the League expanded in the 1967-1968 season.13 ' The
lack of player mobility due to the present free agency system has eroded the
competitive balance in the NHL. As a result, only a few teams each year
have a realistic chance of winning the Stanley Cup.
This part of the paper will analyze the issue of "competitive balance"
and its relationship with free agency in professional sports. In order to fully
comprehend the impact that a less restrictive form of free agency would
have on the competitive balance in the NHL, it is necessary to analyze the
impact free agency has had on the competitive balance in other professional
sports.
"Competitive balance refers to the relative strengths of teams in a
league." 1 3 Competitive balance is a desirable goal for a sports league. It
occurs when there is a relative parity among the member teams and "each
team has the opportunity of becoming a contender over a reasonable cycle
of years ....
134
1 35
Stephan F. Ross in his article entitled, Monopoly Sports Leagues,
reveals some rather intriguing data pertaining to free agency and competitive balance. The article examines the extent of the competitive balance in
Major League Baseball and the National Football League. 13 6 Ross asserts
that, based upon empirical evidence, the reserve clause and the Rozelle rule
are "perverse ways" to prevent a small number of teams from dominating
137
their respective leagues.
The study conducted by Ross centered around arbitrator Peter Sietz's
ruling in Messersmith. 13 This decision held that the reserve clause in Ma131. John Kreisen, Hockey Digest, June/July, 1991, at 61.
132. The Stanley Cup winners since 1967-68 have been the Montreal Canadiens, Philadelphia
Flyers, New York Islanders, Boston Bruins, Calgary Flames, Edmonton Oilers, and the Pittsburgh Penguins. The Stanley Cup is awarded annually to the team winning the National Hockey
League's best of seven final playoff round.
133. Roger Noll, The Economies of Sports Leagues in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, § 17.03 [4], at 17-25 (G. Uberstine ed. 1988).
134. Philadelphia World Hockey C. v. Philadelphia Hockey C., 351 F.Supp. 462, 486 (E.D.
Pa. 1972).
135. Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643 (1989).
136. Id. at 645-46.
137. Id. at 673. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976)
(court defines the Rozelle Rule).
138. Ross, supra note 135, at 673 n.136; see also Messersmith Arbitration, supra note 48, at
101, 110-11.
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jor League Baseball was invalid and that baseball players were not bound to
a Club in perpetuity.1 3 9 The study analyzed the seven years preceding the
Messersmith decision and compared the data to a similar time period after
14
the abolition of the reserve clause. 0
The results indicated that in the period before the Messersmith decision,
a total of thirty-four teams were in the pennant race, in the post Messersmith period, the data indicated that forty-eight teams were in the pennant
race. 14 1 The study defined a team in a pennant race as one that finished no
more than 10 games behind the pennant winner. 4 2
Taking the study one step further Ross examined the number of teams
that won divisional titles. 143 "If the increased ability to use cash made it
easier for teams to build a pennant winner by signing free agents, then a
greater variety of teams should win pennants following Messersmith than
during the era of the reserve clause."'" From 1969 to 1975, eleven separate
franchises won divisional titles; in the seven post-Messersmith years, seventeen franchises captured division titles.
To further put the competitive balance issue into perspective, the decade
of the 1980s proved to be a highly competitive decade for Major League
Baseball. Throughout the decade, twenty-one of the twenty-six Major
League teams captured divisional titles. The Los Angeles Dodgers were the
only team to win the World Series twice and they accomplished that feat in
1981 and 1988.14s
Stephan Ross also utilized a common statistical measurement, the standard deviation, to reveal the effects that player restraints have had on competitive balance. In his study, the smaller the standard deviation, the
139. Messersmith Arbitration, supra note 48, at 110-11.
140. Ross, supra note 135, at 673-74.
141. Id. at 674 (citing THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 483-585 (7th ed. 1988)).
142. Ross, supra note 135, at 674.
143. Id.
144. Id. It must be noted that 26 teams in the major leagues play 162 games each. The
twenty-six teams are divided into four divisions. Only one team from each division will capture
the divisional pennant.
In contrast, each of the twenty-one teams in the NHL plays only 80 games (the twenty-one
teams are divided into four divisions) and sixteen of the twenty-one teams make the playoffs.
Some critics will claim that it is irrational to compare a divisional pennant race and the Stanley Cup playoffs. However, it is possible to compare the two formats. Based on the reasoning that
in the National Hockey League, the teams playoff against inter division rivals in the first rounds of
the playoffs and ultimately four teams will remain each representing their respective divisions.
In major league baseball, in the last month of September interdivisional rivals usually play
each other for the divisional championship. These series are sometimes called "mini playoffs".
145. Collusion II, supra note 114, at 674. For the first time since the 1940s no team won the
World Series in consecutive years. GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 18, 1989, at A14.
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greater the degree of competitive balance."
In comparing the NFL and
Major League Baseball, it was revealed that baseball had a much lower
standard deviation.147 The NFL, which has strict rules that effectively limit
free agency, had a higher standard deviation among the final four Super
Bowl semifinalists during the 18 year period from 1970 to 1987.148
It can be concluded that if a league is more competitively balanced, then
more teams will contend for the Division Championship and the League
Championship. Furthermore, "[f]an interest increases if more teams realistically vie for that prize." 149 All else equal, a team will have greater success
at the gate if it is a winner, and if it is engaged in close competition with its
rivals.150 Thus, overall league attendance, a proxy of consumer/fan interest, "will be substantially higher if several teams alternate in winning pen15 1
nants than if one team tends to dominate."
Therefore, it is clear that based on the Ross study, a less restrictive free
agent system has proven to enhance competitive balance in Major League
Baseball. This conclusion can and should be extended to the other professional leagues - especially if a competitively balanced league will lead to
increased revenues from attendance and other revenue sources which will in
turn lead to a healthier industry for both owners and players.
IV.

COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN THE NATIONAL

HOCKEY LEAGUE

In 1967-1968, the NHL expanded from the "original six" to twelve
teams. Since that time the League has evolved into a twenty-two team
146. Ross, supra note 135, at 675 n.148 (citing R. PARSONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: DECISIoN-MAKING APPROACH, 79-80 (1974).

The standard deviation is a common statistic used to measure the dispersal of observed data.
R. PARSONS, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: A DECISION-MAKING APPROACH, 79-80. The standard

deviation if the four division titles in National and America League East and West Divisions were
randomly distributed over a 10 year period would be 0.51. Ross, supra note 135, at 675 n.148. If
four teams won their division titles every time during a 10 year period the standard deviation
would be 3.6. Id.
147. Ross, supra note 135, at 675-76, nn.149-50. Standard deviation in MLB was 1.66. Id. at
676.
148. Id. at 675 & n.149. During the 1970 to 1987 period, if all NFL teams were equal, they
would statistically have progressed to the conference championship game 2.67 times. Id. at 675
n.149. The standard deviation measures the gap between the statistical average and the reality
that seven teams were Super Bowl semi-finalists, while eight franchises were among the final four,
five or more times. Id. Only six of twenty-eight NFL teams went to the Super Bowl two or three
times, as would occur if the league were balanced. Id; see also SPORTS ENCYCLOPEDIA: PRO
FOOTBALL, 187-510 (D. Neff & R. Cohen eds. 1987)(listing NFL standings from 1970-86). The
standard deviation in the NFL from 1974 to 1987 was 2.74. Ross, supra note 135, at 675.
149. Ross, supra note 135, at 674.
150. Noll, supra note 133, § 17.03[1], at 17-5.
151. Ross, supra note 135, at 674.
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League. Despite this expansion, the League has been dominated over the
last twenty-four years by the same teams. Since 1967-1968, the Montreal
Canadiens152 have won nine Stanley Cups, including four consecutive Cups
in the late 1970's. The New York Islanders"5 3 captured the Stanley Cup
four consecutive times starting in the 1979-1980 season. The Edmonton
Oilers15 4 won the Stanley Cup four times in five years in the 1980s. The
Philadelphia Flyers 5 won two consecutive Stanley Cups in the mid 1970s.
The Boston Bruins 1 6 captured the Stanley Cup twice in the early 1970s.
Finally, in 1989, the Calgary Flames and in 1991, the Pittsburgh Penguins"5 7 respectively, joined this elite group when they won the Stanley Cup
for the first time.
Not only did these teams capture all of the Stanley Cups since expan1 58
sion, these teams were also Stanley Cup finalists a total of thirteen times.
Over the last twenty-four years there have been a total of 48 finalists in the
Stanley Cup. These seven teams have combined to fill 37 out of possible 48
playoff positions.
Only six other NHL Clubs have made the Stanley Cup finals since the
1967-1968 season.1 59 The St. Louis Blues lost in the final three consecutive
152. Montreal Canadiens:

1967-68, 1968-69, 1970-71, 1972-73, 1975-76, 1976-77, 1977-78, 1978-79, 1985-86. NHL
Official Guide and Record Book, (1991-92). supra note 5, at 190.

153. New York Islanders:
1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1982-83. Id

154. Edmonton Oilers:
1983-84, 1984-85, 1986-87, 1987-88, 1989-90. Id.
155. Philadelphia Flyers:
1973-74, 1974-75. Id.
156. Boston Bruins:
1969-70, 1971-72. Id.
157. Calgary Flames:
1988-89. Id
Pittsburgh Penguins:
1990-1991. Id,
158. Stanley Cup Finalists:
Montreal Canadiens
1988-89
New York Islanders
1983-84
Edmonton Oilers
1982-83
Philadelphia Flyers
1986-87, 1984-85, 1979-80, 1975-76
Boston Bruins
1989-90, 1987-88, 1977-78, 1976-77, 1972-73
Calgary Flames
1985-86.
Ia.
159. Stanley Cup Finalists:
St. Louis Blues
1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-70
New York Rangers
1971-72, 1978-79
Chicago Black Hawks
1970-71, 1972-73
Vancouver Canucks
1981-82
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years starting in 1967-68. The New York Rangers and the Chicago Black
Hawks were finalists twice each in the 1970s. The Minnesota North Stars
have appeared in the finals twice. The Vancouver Canucks and the Buffalo
Sabres each appeared in the finals on one occasion.
From analyzing the above statistics it is clear that the NHL is not competitively balanced. The continued dominance of a few organizations have
made it very difficult for other teams to become competitive and achieve the
ultimate goal - the Stanley Cup.
Some hockey experts contend that the League is reaching a state of parity. That any team is capable in any given game of defeating any other
team. Although some consideration must be given to such a statement, if
the League is in such a state of parity, why is it that only four teams won
the Stanley Cup in the 1980s? The League may be reaching a state of parity
during the regular season but when playoffs begin the same teams win year
after year. The stark reality is that, at the beginning of each season, only a
few teams in the NHL have a realistic chance of reaching the Stanley Cup
final.
When the NHLPA and the NHL negotiate a new agreement, they must
address the problem of competitive balance in the NHL. It is contended
that a less restrictive form of free agency should be implemented in order to
remedy the problem of competitive balance. However, there are various
issues that must be dealt with in order to make a less restrictive free agent
system a success.
A.

Issue 1 - Players' Choices: Will the players who are eligiblefor free
agency be attracted to the most lucrative markets?

One school of thought suggests that if there is a truly competitive market for "free agent players" the most successful teams will be assembled in
the most lucrative markets. The economic theory of wage determination in
sports predicts that if there is a competitive market for players, then players
will be paid the amount of their contribution to net revenue. As a result,
the proponents of this view claim that "net revenues for a star player are
likely to be higher, all else equal, in the most lucrative markets."" Thus,
the wealthiest teams will attract the star players and only a few teams will
dominate their respective leagues.

Minnesota North Stars
Buffalo Sabres

1980-81, 1990-91
1974-75.

Id.
160. Noll, supra note 133, § 17.03[4], at 17-25.
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This view is supported by NFL officials who believe that an open market will not enhance the competitive balance of their League.16 1 They submit that free agents will move to markets with the wealthiest teams or to
"glamour cities" like New York, Los Angeles, and Miami. 162
In Stephan Ross' article Sports Monopolies, the author examined the
movement of free agents in Major League Baseball during a period from
1976 to 1985.163 The study tested the league officials' contentions that unrestricted player mobility leads to players signing with contenders in warm
weather cities with large populations.'
The results did not support the
165
views.
official
League's
First, a multiple regression analysis assessed the impact of the
net movement of free agents each year, characterizing each franchise
by the population of its home city, previous year's place in the standings, and median temperature in April. This analysis revealed no
systematic relationship between a franchise's
place in the standings
66
and its ability to sign free agents.'
Further analysis revealed a very weak positive relationship to the extent
that it was not statistically significant, over the entire 10 year period, between, on one hand, temperature and population and, on the other hand, a
franchise's record in signing and losing players in the free agent market.1 67
The study revealed that:
franchises in the larger cities have a limited edge in attracting free
agents in an open market; for every additional million residents, a
team will sign fewer than one free agent a decade. Indeed, over the
decade of active free agency, the Los Angeles Dodgers and the New
York Mets lost more free agents than they signed. 6 '

161. Ross, supra note 135, at 681 (citing Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F.Supp. 738, 745-46
(D.D.C. 1976); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976)).
162. Ross, supra note 135, at 681; Smith, 420 F. Supp., at 745-46.
163. Ross, supra note 135, at 670-683.
164. Id. at 679-683.
165. Id. at 682-84.
166. Id. at 683.
167. Id. at 683 n.171.
Another empirical study indicates that there is a clear trend of movement of free agents from
good teams to poorer ones. Besanko and Simon, Resource Allocation in the Baseball Player's
Labor Market: An Empirical Investigation, Fall 1985, REv. Bus. & ECON. RESOURCES, 71, 83.
168. Ross, supra note 135, at 683 n.172 (citing Drahozal, THE IMPACT OF FREE AGENCY ON
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PLAYING TALENT IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 38 J. ECON. & Bus.,

113, 117 (1986)) (stating empirical studies find, "no movement of free agents in the sample from
small cities to big cities"); but see Besanko & Simon, supra note 167, at 82-83 (noting some movement of free agents from small to large cities)).
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In applying the above findings to the 1989-1990 crop of most notable free
agents in Major League Baseball, it can be concluded that Ross' observations have been supported to some extent.
Pitcher Mark Davis, the 1989-1990 National League CY Young award
winner, was the most sought after free agent. Davis who gained his fame as
a relief pitcher with the San Diego Padres chose to leave sunny California
and signed a multi-year deal with the Kansas City Royals. 6 9 Furthermore,
three members of the 1989 World Champions Oakland Athletics pursued
the free agent market and signed with teams in smaller markets and more
170
temperate climates.
Some players did sign contracts with teams located in larger markets
and warm climates. Pitcher Mark Langston of the Montreal Expos left
Montreal, Canada, for California. 171 Rickey Henderson, an all-star center
fielder with the Oakland athletics re-signed with his team. Similarly, allstar free agents Robin Yount, Kent Hrbek, and Kirby Puckett all signed
deals to remain with their respective teams which are located in smaller
markets, with more temperate climates despite the fact that their respective
teams were not contenders in 1989.
It is quite apparent that a player will take into account several factors
when determining where he should play. Mark Davis' agent, Alan Hendricks of Houston, Texas, reportedly stated, "this is the fifth best offer we
had, ...if we were going for money records, we could have gone someplace
one of the leading places
else .... Mark always felt that Kansas City was
1 72
to play, with its ball park and the town itself."
Edward Garvey, the former director of the National Football Players
Association had these views on the issue of player allocation in an open
market:
The simple fact is that professional athletes have as many geographical preferences as lawyers, teachers, machinists, or Congressmen.
Some people want to live on the coast, some in the Midwest, and
some in the South. Their choices are based on family background,
where their families live, where they went to school, where they wish
to raise a family, where they have educational and vocational opportunities. While obviously money is a factor, there are many others.

169. Joseph Durso, Mark Davis Sign With Royals for $13 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1988, § 13, at 15, col. 4. Davis signed a four year deal worth $13 million. Id.
170. Dave Parker signed with the Milwaukee Brewers, Tony Phillips signed with the Detroit
Tigers, and Storm Davis signed with the Kansas City Royals.
171. Mike Downey, Cowboy Spends $16 Million to Lasso A.L Flag, THE SPORTING NEWS,
Dec. 18, 1989, at 4.
172. Durso, supra note 169, at 15.
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The primary one that I have found in talking with
professional ath173
letes is that they will go where they can perform.
Thus, professional athletes will take into consideration many different factors in making a decision to sign with another team.
It should be noted that in Major League Baseball, the most notable free
agents receive very lucrative offers from various Clubs. Since the competitive balance in Major League Baseball has been enhanced, there are more
financially successful Clubs that are able to competitively bid for free
agents. As a result, when an all-star free agent receives numerous offers, all
of which are very tempting, he will consider many different factors in reaching a decision.
Conversely, as the NHL is not competitively balanced, there is great
disparity in wealth among the teams in the League. As a result, there is a
"fear" amongst Owners that in reality only a few teams in the NHL will be
able to competitively bid for an all-star free agent's services. Thus, there is
a greater likelihood that net revenues for a star player are likely to be
higher, all else equal in the most lucrative markets. Consequently, this factor may further accentuate the lack of economic and competitive balance in
the NHL. The Owners and the NHLPA must deal with this problem when
collectively bargaining over the issue of free agency. By instituting a more
intricate "revenue sharing program" and a "salary cap system," the parties
will be able to remedy the problem of financial disparity amongst the teams
and ensure that all teams in the League become more economically and
competitively balanced.
B. Issue 2 - Revenue SharingAmongst Owners: Is a more intricate
revenue sharingprogram amongst the Clubs in the League
needed to ensure the League will be both
economically and competitively balanced?
The four major professional sports all have a formula for dividing revenues between the clubs in the leagues. The main sources of revenues are
gate receipts and income from national television (TV) contracts.
173. Ross, supra note 135 at 682 n.168 (quoting Inquiry into ProfessionalSports: Hearings
Before the House Select Comm. on ProfessionalSports, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 216 (1977) (emphasis
added)); see also Smith v. Profootball, 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-84 n.46 (D.C.C. 1978) (providing
additional factors including: business opportunities, racial discrimination, community atmosphere, climate, educational opportunities, present owner, coaches and/or management).
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1. Revenue Sharing in the National Hockey League
The NHL is the only major professional sport that does not have a television contract with a major network in the United States of America. 74
The NHL does have a contract with Sports Channel America, which is a
regional cable company. 7 5 It is a contract for $51 million over three years.
The contract expired at the end of the 1990-91 season.17 6 The $17 million a
year was distributed evenly amongst the member Clubs of the NHL. A
second source of revenue is from the games shown on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and on the Sports Network (TSN). The revenues derived from the contract with CBC and TSN are distributed evenly
amongst the twenty-one Clubs in the League.
There are other sources of television revenues for NHL Clubs. One is
an arrangement between individual teams and local television companies
that service the team's local area. In some of these areas in the United
States, hockey coverage is sold to viewers together with NBA basketball
games in a single television package. 77 Individual Clubs are allowed to
retain any revenue that they derive from such local broadcast contracts.
The expiration of the current deal with Sports Channel America coincides with the expiration of the League's current Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Television revenue has proven to be a large source of revenue
in other major professional sports. 178 The NHL will now have its opportunity to possibly derive some major revenues from television.1 79 The larger
the League's television contract, the more financially stable the League will
be as a whole. The League's president, John Ziegler, made these statements
pertaining to the broadcast medium in the 1990s:
Our television product will be extended beyond North America to
Europe and Asia. I'm talking about places like Japan and Australia,
interesting areas with died-in-the-wool sports fans. A lot of our
targeting will depend on the political climate. China will be an area
to look at. We believe in the 90's that if you're not global, you're out
of sync.1 80

174. Mark Robichaux, NHL Skates Into a New Season But Not - So Far- on U.S. TV, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 1991, at BI col.4.
175. Id. at B1, col. 4 at B2, col. 3.
176. TVSports Rights, THE SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 11, 1989, at 60.

177.
178.

STAUDOHAR,
ROBICHAUX,

supra note 47, at 140.
supra note 174, at B1.

179. Id.

180. To Grips - The Future, 2 THE
1990) [hereinafter THE HOCKEY NEws].

HOCKEY

NEws, PUB. No.3, Inside Hockey, 31 (Jan.
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Despite Mr. Ziegler's views on "broadcasting in the 90s," the NHL will
be hard pressed to achieve one half of the value of the deal it had with
Sports Channel America.1 8 1 The Broadcasting Journal reports that:
The NHL could be the first major sports League to take a bath on
television rights if it can't find another bidder or get more money out
of current interested parties. Sources say that Sports Channel
America is willing to put up just $3 million - $4 million for annual
rights, down from the $17 million it has paid annually for the last
three years ....
ESPN is said to be offering to take 15 weeks of
games starting next January (season starts in October) and Stanley
Cup semi-finals and Championship
for a price tag, according to one
18 2
source, of more than $6 million.
It appears that the NHL is faced with a difficult task in acquiring a TV
contract. Instead of setting their sights on Europe and Asia, the NHL
should focus their immediate attention in reaching the population of North
America.
It appears the prospects for a new lucrative National TV deal are not
encouraging. Thus, the twenty-one teams in the NHL will rely heavily on
the revenues they generate from their home attendance record. Each team
plays forty home games throughout the regular season. The home team in
the NHL is entitled to one hundred percent of the gate receipts.18 3 Thus, it
is very important to the home team that they ice a very entertaining and
successful product in order to attract a large number of people to their
games.
The greater a team's attendance record, the greater their ancillary revenues. Ancillary revenues can be described as revenues generated from concessions, parking, dasherboads, advertising, and luxury boxes. However,
not all teams in the NHL receive revenues from these ancillary sources.
Furthermore, sixteen of the twenty-one teams make the playoffs. The
teams that make the playoffs raise their ticket prices from the amount they
charge during the regular season. The playoffs can be very lucrative for a
team that advances to the Stanley Cup finals. If a team with the home ice
advantage plays the maximum amount of games throughout the playoffs, it
will host 16 playoff games. The minimum number of home games a team
181. Id.
182. Cold Reception, 120 BROADCASTING, PUB. No. 23 (June 10, 1991). The NHL entered
into a one year contract with Sports Channel America for an estimated value of $5.5 million.
Media Sports Business News Analysis, Oct. 9, 1991.
183. By-law, supra note 52, at § 29.1 (Gate Receipts). A statement of all gate receipts for
each Championship game, certified by a duly authorized offer of the member club shall be mailed
to the President the day after playing of such a Championship game. Id.
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will host if it reaches the Stanley Cup finals is eight. 184 This year, the Stanley Cup champions, the Pittsburgh Penguins, hosted thirteen playoff games
and the Stanley Cup finalist, the Minnesota North Stars, hosted eleven playoff games. The home team in the playoffs is entitled to the gate receipts of
each home game with a share of the receipts going to the League.1 85
Hence, the more successful a team is in the playoffs, the greater the
amount of revenues it will be able to generate. Roger Noll writes that,
a team will have greater success at the gate if it is a winner, and if it
is engaged in close competition with its rivals. Winning a championship is not only important in the year of the championship, but it has
a carryover effect in the following few years. Typically teams will
sell far more season tickets (or, charge substantially higher prices) in
the years immediately after a championship. . . . Because of the
spillover effect a league generally will be more profitable if several
teams are in contention for the championship,
and if over the years
18 6
different teams emerge as the winner.
However, this is not the case in the National Hockey League. Due to
the fact that the NHL is not competitively balanced, only a few teams since
expansion have reaped the monetary benefits of the playoff system. Based
on the fact that Clubs in the NHL derive the majority of their revenues
from gate receipts and ancillary revenues, there is a nexus for the most part,
between a team that is successful in the playoffs, and financial stability.
Thus, if the League is more competitively balanced there will be more financially stable Clubs.
2.

Revenue Sharing in the NFL, MLB, NBA

In the National Football League, the Owners divide the gate revenues
1 7
on a sixty/forty basis, with the larger percentage going to the home team.
The NFL evenly divides its television contracts amongst its member Clubs.
The NFL's television contracts are worth $3.6 billion over four years. The
average annual net for each team is $32.5 million.18 8
In Major League Baseball, the home team keeps eighty-five percent
while visiting teams receive fifteen percent of the gate revenues.1 8 9 Like the
NFL, Major League Baseball teams evenly divide television revenues
184. Id. at §§ 27.5(d), 27.6(e), 27.7, 27.8.
185. Id. at § 29.2.
186. Noll, supra note 133, § 17.03[1], at 17-15.
187. Id. at 17-4.
188. Larry Weisman, Owners Unanimously Approve TV Deals: No '94 Super Bowl Winner,
USA TODAY, Mar. 12, 1990, at 9C.
189. Scully, supra note 124, at 79.
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amongst the member Clubs. At the end of the 1989 baseball season, Major
League Baseball negotiated a new four year agreement with CBS and ESPN
for a reportedly combined total of $1.06 billion."9 Each team will receive
approximately $14 million per year.
The National Basketball Association has a formula similar to the NHL
when it comes to the division of gate receipts. The home team retains
100% of the gate receipts. Like football and baseball, the NBA is under a
contract with a major TV network and a pay television station. The NBA
has agreements with NBC and TNT totaling $875 million. 191 Each team
receives approximately $5.56 million per season.
Another major source of revenue for some teams is generated by local
TV. Teams are able to negotiate their own local TV contract. These contracts have proven to be very lucrative for most teams especially, for those
located in large metropolitan markets. For example, George Steinbrenner
recently signed a 12 year, $500 million deal on behalf of baseball's New
York Yankees with the Madison Square Garden Network. 192
Does revenue sharing have an effect on both the economic and competitive balance in professional sports? Economist Gerald Scully has argued
during a Congressional hearing that economic competitiveness in sports
leagues will result solely from complete revenue sharing. 193 Revenue sharing is essential to the viability of poorer teams and those located in smaller
markets.' 94 A revenue sharing system would allow teams to compete more
effectively with other teams for players' services.' 95 However, if Owners
become reliant upon the revenues from its league revenue sharing program,
then the incentive to spend the money to build a winner and become competitive maybe lost.
This is best exemplified in the National Football League. Ethan Lock,
in his article, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports, con190. TV Sports Rights, supra note 176, at 60. Under the current agreement Baseball TV
rights are allotted to: CBS (1990-93) for $265 million per year and ESPN (1990-93) for $100
million per year. Id.
191. Id. Under the current agreement NBA TV rights are allotted to: NBC (1990-91 - 199394) for $150 million per year and TNT (1990-91 - 1993-94) for $68.75 million per year. Id
192. Will Dunham, Commissioners Threatenedwith AntitrustAction, UNITED PRESS INTER-

NATIONAL, Nov. 14, 1989 (Lexis, Nexis Library, Omni file).
193. Steven Biddle, Less Restrictive Alternativesfor Achieving and Maintaining Competitive

Balance in ProfessionalSports, 30 ARIZ L. Rnv. 889, 901 (1988).
194. Id at 901 n.123.
195. Id at 901 nn.122-123.
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tends that the revenue sharing program removes the economic incentive to
196
produce winning franchises:
Regardless of the system regulating the movement of free agents
which the parties agreed upon at the bargaining table, no economic
incentive exists for a given owner to bid on expensive free agents to
improve the quality of his or her football team. Bidding for an expensive free agent may help a team win more games and most certainly will increase a team's payroll. It will not, however,
197
necessarily increase a team's revenues.
In contrast to the situation that exists in the National Football League,
Major League Baseball Owners have enjoyed periods of competitive bidding
for high priced free agents.
3.

Currency Issues in the NHL

Another issue that will play a part in the formation of a more intricate
revenue sharing plan in the NHL is the currency issue. A unique feature of
the NHL is the fact that seven out of the twenty-one member Clubs are
Canadian teams. This will be a very relevant factor in terms of the implementation of a less restrictive form of free agency.
Free agency is something that Owners will not have any interest in
at all. Increased free agency will make it difficult for the Canadian
teams, specifically Quebec and Winnipeg. There is no way that liberalized free agency would help Canadian teams at all. 198
The revenues of the seven Canadian Clubs are calculated in Canadian
dollars. In comparison, the fourteen teams in the United States of America
generate revenues in United States dollars. As a result, the American teams
in the NHL will have a greater advantage in terms of revenue, because the
U.S. dollar is much stronger than the Canadian dollar.' 9 9 From a financial
standpoint, it is more difficult for teams located in Canada, especially those
teams located in smaller markets of Canada, to compete for free agents with
teams located in the United States of America. The lure of the American
dollar will, for the most part, draw players to the Clubs in the United States
of America.

196. Lock, supra note 7, at 358 n.108 (citing Stolz, Who Really Makes Money in the NFL?,
REGARDIE'S, Oct. 1985, at 73-82).
197. Locke, supra note 7, at 358.
198. THE HOCKEY NEWS, supra note 180, at 33 (quoting Brian Burke, Director of Hockey
Operations for the Vancouver Canucks).
199. The Canadian dollar on the date this paper was written equalled $0.87 U.S.
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Thus, Canadian teams in order to competitively bid for free agent players, will have to bid fifteen to twenty percent higher than Clubs in the
United States of America.
4. Future System for Revenue Sharing in the NHL
If the NHL is to implement a less restrictive form of free agency, the
Clubs in the League should implement a revenue sharing plan that would
increase the financial stability of weaker Clubs as a whole and compensate
the financially insecure Canadian teams for the currency disparity. The
League could accomplish this by implementing a partial revenue pool.
Under this scheme, the League could form a revenue pool from all Club
gate receipts. A certain percentage of every Club's home gate receipts over
the forty game regular season and playoffs could be placed into this central
pool. In addition, a certain fixed percentage of revenues from local broadcast contracts of each team could also be added to the revenue pool. Further, a certain fixed percentage of revenues from ancillary revenues could be
added to the revenue pool.
From this pool the teams that are financially weaker would have a claim
to a certain percentage of the pool depending upon their respective financial
positions. The League must set out the criteria of what must be demonstrated in order to have a claim to the fund. These teams would only be
able to exercise their right to the pool for a specified length of time. 2" The
teams would only be allowed to spend the money they receive from the pool
on retaining their own free agents or on signing new free agents.
It is essential that this revenue sharing plan facilitate greater player
movement and, at the same time, promote a competitive balance. If an
excess amount of funds remain in the pool after the weaker Clubs have
drawn from it, then the money could be ratably distributed back to the
member Clubs of the League or remain in the central pool for future seasons. Under this revenue sharing plan, the Clubs in the League will still
have the incentive to maximize their profits from all sources of revenues
since the amount of revenues they contribute to the fund will only be a
minimal percentage of the revenues they generate. In the meantime, the
Clubs that are struggling financially will be able to turn to the revenue pool
for some assistance to possibly retain the free agent they cannot afford or
acquire a free agent that will make them more competitive in the League.
Critics of this revenue share program raise questions pertaining to this
issue. Why should William Wirtz, the Owner of the Chicago Black Hawks
200. The length of time would be between the last game of the Stanley Cup finals and the first

day of training camp.
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and Ed Snider, the Owner of the Philadelphia Flyers and other wealthy
Owners in the League contribute revenues to a pool so that financially insecure teams will become more competitive? What incentive exists to compel
the wealthy Owners in the League to agree to this plan?
There is no doubt that this revenue share program will be met with
mixed reaction. However, if the NHL wants to become a more competitively balanced League, the parties must implement such a program in conjunction with a more liberalized free agency system and a salary cap system.
The wealthiest teams in the most lucrative markets must recognize the fact
that it is important for the League as a whole to be more competitive.
If the League as a whole becomes more competitive, then the League
will also be more entertaining to the fans located throughout North
America. As a result, the League and the future expansion franchises will
become a more attractive spectator sport. Hence in the long run, the NHL
will be able to negotiate more lucrative television contracts both in North
America and overseas. Such additional revenues would be evenly distributed amongst all the teams in the League - including the wealthy Clubs.
Therefore, if the wealthier Owners are willing to give up a minimum percentage of their gross revenues to the pool, they will ultimately reap the
benefits in the not too distant future.
In any professional sport, the financial stability of all the teams is essential to the successful functioning of a league. In every professional league,
there are teams that are located in strong markets and teams located in
weaker markets. All the Clubs must work together in order to ensure that
all Clubs in the League are financially and competitively balanced. This is
essential to the survival of any league as a whole and, more particularly, to
the survival of the NHL.
C. Issue 3 - Salary Cap: Is a salary cap system needed to ensure that all
teams in the League will have an equal opportunity at signing
free agents?
If the National Hockey League were to adopt a less restrictive form of
free agency it must also implement a system that will prevent the wealthiest
teams in the most lucrative markets from signing all of the highly regarded
free agents. The creation of a salary cap20 1 system would help create a
more competitively balanced League.
201. The definition of a salary cap as set out in the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement
states: 'Salary Cap'. . . shall mean the then - current maximum amount that each Team can pay
in Salaries during an NBA season, subject to rules and exceptions set forth in this Agreement.
1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 100, at Art. VII, Part A, § l(e).
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In March 1983, the National Basketball Association and the National
Basketball Players Association collectively bargained for a salary cap system. The salary cap placed a ceiling on the amount of money a team could
spend on their respective team payrolls.
The salary cap was implemented to deal with specific problems that
were hindering the League. "First, the cap was to alleviate the plight of
several financially troubled franchises."'2 2 Second, "the salary cap was...
to foster a competitive balance among [L]eague franchises. The [C]ap was
thought to give franchises in smaller markets a better chance to compete
with franchises in larger markets by preventing the larger market teams
20 3
from using their greater economic power to buy the best players.
The salary cap commenced operation in the 1984-85 season. The five
teams with the highest payroll in the League, the Los Angeles Lakers, the
New Jersey Nets, the New York Knickerbockers, the Philadelphia 76ers,
and the Seattle Supersonics all had their payrolls frozen at their then current levels because they were already paying more than the salary cap limit
of $3.6 million. 2 ' These teams were unable to sign any free agents unless
205
they were able to reduce their payroll to below the acceptable limit.
Thus, teams in smaller markets or with smaller payrolls were able to sign
free agents without having to competitively bid against wealthier teams in
the league.
Experts have criticized the use of the salary cap and have claimed that
it, "has failed to achieve its objectives2 ' 6 and both players and owners are
disenchanted with the arrangement. 2 7 The cap has had a deadening effect
on player movement within the league, especially for those players with
higher salaries. ' 2 8 Another author claims, "[t]he cap creates an incentive
for teams concerned about exceeding the cap's maximum payroll limit to
cut talented high-salaried reserve players and replace them with less talented players at lower pay. This would obviously decrease the overall qual202. Scott J. Foraker, Note, The National Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust
Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 157 (1985).
203. I at 158. The Salary Cap also guaranteed the players a fixed percentage (53%) of the
league's gross revenues to be paid out in player salaries. NBA COLL. BAR. AGREEMENT, supra

note 100, at Art. VIII, Part D, §§ 1-4.
204. Staudohar, supra note 47, at 125. The Cap was scheduled to rise to $3.8 million in 1985
and to $4 million in 1986/87. Id.
205. There are exceptions to the limit. 1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note
100, Art. VII, Part F, at § 1-7.
206. Biddle, supra note 193, at 903 n.147 (citing D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes
and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L. J. 95, 106-07 (1986); Foraker,
supra note 202, at 157-58).
207. Id. at 903 n.148 (citing Daspin, 62 IND. L.J., at 104-06).
208. Id.
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ity of league play. '2 °) 9 Despite these criticisms, the National Basketball
Association and the National Basketball Players Association entered into a
new Collective Bargaining Agreement on November 1, 1988.
Although there were alterations to the old agreement, the salary cap
framework remained intact even though the NBA, over the length of the
previous 1983 agreement, enjoyed unparalleled growth. League revenue
more than doubled and the average player salary rose over $500,000 per
season, making NBA players the highest paid athletes in team sports.21 0
Nevertheless, the two parties agreed to a continuation of the salary cap:
The primary goal became finding a way to address the player's needs
and the Owners' concerns without threatening the League's newfound financial stability. Our collective attempt at a solution provides for a player to be able to move to a new team after the completion of at least two player contracts and a number of years in the
League, while at the same time tightening some of the salary cap
rules to ensure equal access to player talent.2 1
Over the past two years the National Basketball Association has added
four expansion franchises. In the 1988-1989 season, the League added
teams in Charlotte, North Carolina and Miami, Florida, and this past season the NBA welcomed teams in Minnesota and Orlando, Florida.2" 2 The
salary cap system will serve to be a very valuable device to these expansion
franchises as they acquire players for their respective teams. So long as
these teams have the revenue they will have greater freedom to sign free
agents because in their early years their respective team salaries will be below the salary cap limit.2 13
Recently, however there have been rumblings that the National Basketball Players' Association (NBAPA) has become disenchanted with the salary cap. The Executive Director of the NBAPA has stated:
The league was in trouble, and they came to us and we were able to
do something that brought stability to the league .... We have been
an instrumental part in making the league what it is. The salary cap
209. Foraker, supra note 202, at 177 & n. 119 (citing Juliano, NBA GeneralManagersLiving,
and Dealing, With Salary Cap, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1984, pt. 3, at 7, col.1).
210. Memo from... David Stern, Points of Agreement, SPORTS INC. (May 23, 1988).
211. Id.
212. Staudohar, supra note 47, at 103. Each team paid $32.5 million for entrance into the
league. Id.
213. 1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 100, at Art. VII, Part E, §§ 1-7. The
relevant language in the agreement regarding the salary cap states:
Operation of the Salary Cap.Section (1). A Team's Team Salary may not exceed the Salary
Cap (and an Expansion Team's Team Salary may not exceed 66 and 2/3 percent of the
Salary Cap for its first season and 75% of the Salary Cap for its second season) unless the
Team is using one of the exceptions contained in Part F, Section I below.
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was the answer at the time, but times have changed. There are different economic factors to consider now, and if these same economic
conditions are present in three years, it will be the time to make a
change.2 14
In light of the above comments, the summer of 1993-1994 should prove a
rather interesting when the NBA and the NBAPA negotiate their next Collective Bargaining Agreement.
1. Salary Cap in the NHL
If a less restrictive form of free agency is implemented in the next collective bargaining agreement, the parties involved must consider devising a
corresponding salary cap system. A salary cap system will ensure that the
wealthiest teams in the most lucrative markets will not sign all the all-star
free agents.
Currently in the NHL, the team with the highest payroll is the Los
Angeles Kings. The Kings payroll is approximately $9.5 million. 2 15 The
second highest payroll is that of the Pittsburgh Penguins at $9.2 million.216
The team with the lowest payroll is the Quebec Nordiques, at approximately $4.5 million. 217 The combined salaries of superstars Wayne Gretzky
and Mario Lemieux is greater than the payroll of the Quebec Nordiques.2 18
Thus, there is a great disparity between the highest and lowest payrolls in
the League.
A system based on a minimum and a maximum team salary limits, such
as the one in the NBA would be best suited for the NHL. The NHL and
the NHLPA must calculate a minimum team salary and a maximum team
salary. 2 19 The issues of deferred compensation, signing bonuses, loans to
players, performance bonuses, and the currency issue must be dealt with in
determining these limits. 220 The top five or six Clubs should be prevented

from signing any free agents unless they are able to lower their respective
Id. at Art. VII, Part E, § l(a).
214. Dupree, supra note 111, at 1C.
215.

NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION (May 1991).

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The combined salaries are approximately $5,310,000.
219. The NBA Collective Gargaining Agreement defines minimum team salary as the minimum amount that each Team can pay in salaries during an NBA season subject to rules and
exceptions set forth in the agreement. 1988 NBA COLL. BARG. AGREEMENT, supra note 100, at

Art. V11, Part G, §§ 1-6.
220. These issues were negotiated in the 1988 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Id. at
Part B, § 1 (Deferred Compensation), § 2 (Signing Bonuses), § 3 (Loans to Players), § 4 (Performance Bonuses).
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payrolls below the salary cap limit. The salary cap limit should increase on
a yearly basis, in relation to increases in the gross revenues of the League as
a whole. There should be numerous exceptions to exceeding the salary cap
limit.221 The most notable exception should occur when a team re-signs its
own free agent.
This should be permitted for the following reasons. It allows the team
the choice to retain a player that it may have invested considerable time and
money into the player's development. The team may feel that the player
will contribute to its team in the future as he may have done in the past.
Additionally, it allows a player the freedom to remain with a team he may
have been with for many years.
The NHL has plans to expand as it enters the 1990s. The National
Hockey League Board of Governors voted to add seven teams to its twentyone member League during this decade. The first group of teams will be
added in the 1992-1993 season at a cost of $50 million per team.2 22 If a less
restrictive free agency system is adopted, a salary cap will be needed in
order for the expansion franchises to be competitive in acquiring free
agents. It will enable the expansion teams to acquire veteran free agents
without having to outbid the teams with the highest payrolls. Thus, an
expansion franchise will be able to be more competitive earlier on in its
existence.
A salary cap system will help foster a more competitively balanced
League. It will enable the teams in smaller markets to competitively bid for
free agents without having to bid against the wealthiest teams with the largest payrolls. By signing quality free agents, these teams will become more
successful both on the ice and at the gate. As a result, the League will
prosper as a whole. Thus, if the NHL and the NHLPA collectively bargain
for a less restrictive free agency system, a salary cap system should be
considered.
V.

CASE ANALYSIS - ST.

Louis BLUES

In the 1989-90 season, Brett Hull, a young superstar, played out his
option with the St. Louis Blues (Blues). That season, the Blues finished the
season in second place in the Norris Division with eighty-three points. The
total was the tenth best overall finish in the League. Hull led the League in
goals 9cored.

221. Id. at Art. VII, Part F, §§ 1-6.
222. TORONTO STAR, Dec. 10, 1989.
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In the same season, the St. Louis Blues' average home attendance was
approximately 13,700 spectators per game.22 3 The estimated average ticket
price in St. Louis during the 1989-90 season was fifteen dollars. During the
regular season, the Blues hosted forty home games. Thus, in the 1989-1990
season, the Blues generated approximately $8,220,000.00 in gate receipts.224
It is estimated that only four Clubs had lower average attendance per game
than the Blues.2 25 It is further estimated that only three Clubs had lower
ticket prices than the Blues.22 6
At the conclusion of the 1989-90 season, the Blues signed Hull. The
Blues also signed Scott Stevens.2 27 The Blues had great expectations for the
1990-91 season. The Blues proceeded to have their most successful campaign ever and finished the season in second place in the Norris Division
with 105 points.2 2 That total was the second best overall finish in the
League. Hull2 29 and Stevens proved to be profitable investments. At the
box office, the Blues realized their investments.
In 1990-91, the Blues' average home attendance was approximately
15,400.230 The estimated average ticket price in St. Louis during the 199091 season was $19.00. During the regular season, the Blues hosted forty
games. Thus, in the 1990-91 season, the Blues generated approximately
$11,700,000 in gate receipts - an increase of approximately $3,484,000 over
the previous season.2 31
This increase, however, only reflects an increase in gate receipts. The*
Blues profited in other areas during the 1990-91 season. These areas in223. St. Louis Blues, National Hockey League.
224.
Average
X Estimated X Total
Attendance
Per Game

Average
Ticket

Price
13,711

X $15.00

=

Home
Games

X

Played
40

Total
Estimated
Gate

=

Receipts
$8,220,000.00

Id.
225. These four NHL Clubs include: Buffalo, Winnipeg, Hartford, and the New York
Islanders.

226. These three NHL Clubs with ticket prices lower than in St. Louis include: Buffalo,
Quebec and Washington.
227. The combined salaries for Hull and Stevens for 1990-1991 was $2,983,000.00.
228.
Total
Overall
Season
Points
Finish
1989-90
85
10th
Hull playing out his option
1990-91
105
2nd
Hull and Stevens
229. Hull scored a League high - 86 goals and tallied 131 points.
230. St. Louis Blues, National Hockey League.
231.
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cluded local TV rights and other ancillary revenues.2 32 The Blues, by
resorting to the free agent market, improved their standing both competitively and economically.
Learning from last year's experiences, the Blues in 1991 remained the
most active team in the NHL, pursuing free agents Christian and
Shanahan. However, on Tuesday, September 3, 1991, the Blues, who made
a concerted effort to sign free agents over the past two seasons, paid the
ultimate price in the Shanahan arbitration. The Blues, who relinquished
five first round draft choices to sign Stevens in July 1990, were forced to
give up Stevens for Shanahan.233
Over the past two years, there has been a growing resentment between
the Clubs in the NHL and the St. Louis Blues. It has become quite clear
that certain teams have resented the way the Blues have utilized the free
agent market to become economically and competitively successful.
What the decision has served to do, however, far beyond penalyzing
the Blues for their willingness to spend money and to improve their
team, is to remind just how off base the arbitration process is and
23 4
how free agency in the NHL really doesn't work.
The Blues, whose record in the last regular season was second by a
point only to the Blackhawks', developed a wild notion that the acquisition of one more quality player might mean rewarding their
loyal fans with a championship in the near future . . . . To [St.
Louis] [O]wner, Shanahan's lodge brothers, making progress doesn't
hold a candle to making money, and if he doesn't believe that now,
2 35
he never will.
St. Louis star forward, Brett Hull, "is convinced his team is being singled out for taking advantage of a free agent system the NHL would rather
didn't exist."' 236 Hull stated the following:
Average
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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1990-1991
=
$3,484,000
AND 1989-1990
232. It is most difficult to substantiate this claim because these revenues are not made public.
233. Bob Verdi, Blues pay dearlyfor "free'agent, THE CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 1991 at 1. In
essence, the Blues relinquished Scott Stevens and five first round draft choices for Brendan
Shanahan. The St. Louis Blues signed a Group I free agent and relinquished a Group II free
agent as compensation.
234. Morrison, supra note 62, at 73.
235. Verdi, supra note 233, at 1.
236. Steve Simmons, Hull hits hard at NHL, TORONTO SUN, Sept. 5, 1991, at 88, col. -.
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This whole thing is an embarrassment for the League... it's a joke,
it's a farce and it's an embarrassment... we (the Blues) just got the
shaft. The message was clear: don't sign free agents. We (the
Blues) worked within their system and we're being screwed for it.
The League wants to punish the Blues.23 7
The desire to maintain the status quo established in the NHL is something
that deters the enhancement of the League both from an economic and
competitive standpoint.
As soon as a team steps out of line and challenges the status quo establishment, the NHL is quick to respond. It is Arbitrator Houston's ruling in
the Shanahan matter that supports the contention that the present system
of free agency in the NHL is ineffective.
Despite the loss of Stevens, the Blues have joined the NHL elite by signing free agents. The Blues have benefited from these signings, both economically and competitively, to the extent that they have a realistic chance of
winning the Stanley Cup in the 1991-92 season. The rest of the League
should follow the Blues' lead. If they do, the League as a whole will prosper both economically and competitively.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the National Hockey League embarks upon the era of the 1990s, it is
essential that the National Hockey League and the National Hockey
League Players' Association reach a new collective bargaining agreement
that will allow the League and its future franchises to prosper both on and
off the ice. The parties must decide if they are satisfied with only seven
teams winning the Stanley Cup over the past twenty-four years.
By implementing into the 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreement a
more liberalized free agency system coupled with a more intricate revenue
sharing program and a salary cap system, the NHL will be able to enhance
the competitiveness of the teams in the League. As a result, more teams in
the League will have a realistic opportunity of capturing the Stanley Cup.
A more liberalized free agency system will enable players to move more
freely to a team of their choice. Clubs will be able to sign bona fide free
agents who will be able to play a very instrumental role in the success of a
Club. A salary cap system will prohibit the wealthiest teams in the most
lucrative markets from signing the most notable free agents. A revenue
sharing program will assist the financially insecure teams to retain or pur-
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sue free agents in order to increase the economic viability of their
organizations.
The League's inability to secure a contract with a major TV network in
the United States of America is an important factor in the implementation
of a free agency system. Clubs in the NHL are unable to rely on substantial
revenues generated from a national TV contract. A team in the League
must generate the majority of revenue from home attendance and ancillary
revenue in order to be financially successful. A nexus exists between a
Club's success in the NHL playoffs and financial stability. It is critical that
more Clubs become successful in the Stanley Cup playoffs.
In order for the parties to achieve a truly competitive League, they must
implement the optimum system of player mobility - a system that will be
beneficial to all parties involved. A more liberalized free agency system,
coupled with a revenue sharing program and a salary cap system, will enable the League to improve its financial and competitive balance as we move
into the 1990s and the century beyond.

